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Abstract
We study the chore division problem where a set of agents needs to divide a set of chores
(bads) among themselves fairly and efficiently. We assume that agents have linear disutility
(cost) functions. Like for the case of goods, competitive division is known to be arguably the
best mechanism for the bads as well. However, unlike goods, there are multiple competitive
divisions with very different disutility value profiles in bads. Although all competitive divisions
satisfy the standard notions of fairness and efficiency, some divisions are significantly fairer
and efficient than the others. This raises two important natural questions: Does there exist a
competitive division in which no agent is assigned a chore that she hugely dislikes? Are there
simple sufficient conditions for the existence and polynomial-time algorithms assuming them?
We investigate both these questions in this paper. We show that the first problem is strongly
NP-hard. Further, we derive a simple sufficient condition for the existence, and we show that
finding a competitive division is PPAD-hard assuming the condition. These results are in sharp
contrast to the case of goods where both problems are strongly polynomial-time solvable. To
the best of our knowledge, these are the first hardness results for the chore division problem,
and, in fact, for any economic model under linear preferences.
1 Introduction
We consider the chore division problem where a set of n agents needs to divide m divisible chores
(bads) among themselves in a fair and efficient manner. We assume that agents have linear
disutility (cost) functions, i.e., each agent i has a disutility d(i, j) > 0 for a unit amount of chore j,
and her disutility for an allocation in which Xij amount of chore j is assigned to her is
∑
j d(i, j)Xij .
A division based on competitive equilibrium is arguably the best mechanism for this problem due
to its remarkable fairness and efficiency guarantees; we refer to the seminal papers of Bogomolnaia
et al. [BMSY17, BMSY19] for an elaborate discussion. Competitive equilibrium is a central solution
concept in economics, where prices and allocation are such that demand meets supply when each
agent gets her most preferred assignment. Two most ideal economic models to study competitive
division of chores are Fisher (fixed incomes) and Exchange. An exchange model is like a barter
system, where each agent comes with an initial endowment of chores and exchanges them with others
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to minimize her disutility function. Fisher is a special case of exchange model where each agent
has a fixed proportion of each chore. Competitive Equilibrium with Equal Incomes (CEEI) [Var74]
is a further special case of Fisher where each agent has the same endowment.
The vast majority of work in fair division focuses on the case of disposable goods that agents
enjoy or at least can throw away at no cost. The equilibrium computation problem is well-
understood in the case of goods. For the exchange model, even though an equilibrium may
not always exist, there is a simple (polynomial-time) necessary and sufficient condition for the
existence [Gal76], convex programming formulations [Jai07, DGV16], and polynomial-time algo-
rithms [Jai07, Ye07, DM15, DGM16, GV19]. On the other hand, for the Fisher model, an equi-
librium always exists, and there are further specialized convex programs [EG59, Shm09, CDG+17]
and algorithms [DPSV08, Orl10, Ve´g12, Ve´g14] in addition to the ones for the exchange model.
However, many situations contain undesirable bads (e.g., house chores and job shifts). Clearly,
chores are nondisposable and must be allocated. Bogomolnaia et al. [BMSY17, BMSY19] showed
that the chore division problem is quite different than the case of goods; namely, there are multiple
disconnected sets of equilibria with different disutility value profiles. They also conjectured that the
computational problem is likely to be more difficult in this case; however, neither polynomial-time
algorithms nor hardness results have been obtained so far. Polynomial-time algorithms are known
only for the special case of constantly many agents (or chores) [BS19, GM20]. Although these
algorithms are obtained for the Fisher model, they easily extend to the exchange as well.
Let us now consider an example where two agents need to divide two chores with unit supply
each, and agents have the same endowment. Assume that the disutility values are: d(1, 1) =
d(2, 2) = 1; d(1, 2) = d(2, 1) = L, where L 1. There are three competitive divisions in this case:
X1 =
[
1 0
0 1
]
, X2 =
[
1 L−12L
0 L+12L
]
, and X3 =
[
L+1
2L 0
L−1
2L 1
]
.
The disutility value profiles at these divisions are (1, 1), (L+12 ,
L+1
2L ), and (
L+1
2L ,
L+1
2 ) respectively.
Observe that as L approaches infinity, one agent’s disutility value approaches infinity in the last two
divisions (X2 and X3). Although they all satisfy the standard fairness and efficiency properties,
namely no envy, proportionality, Pareto efficiency, and so on, one would still want to use the first
division that is clearly significantly fairer and efficient among the three. Hence, a important natural
question is:
Question 1. Does there exist a competitive division where no agent i is allocated a chore j that
she hugely dislikes, i.e., for which d(i, j) is greater than equal to a given threshold τ?
In the above example, for any τ > 1 the answer is “yes”, otherwise “no”. This leads to another
natural question:
Question 2. Are there simple sufficient conditions for the existence? And, can we compute a
competitive division in polynomial-time under them?
In this paper, we investigate both these questions for the exchange model. We show that
answering the first question is strongly NP-hard, even in the CEEI setting. Further, we derive
a simple sufficient condition for the existence, and for them, we show that finding a competitive
division is PPAD-hard. These results are in sharp contrast to the case of goods where both problems
are strongly polynomial-time solvable.1 To the best of our knowledge, these are the first hardness
results for the chore division problem, and, in fact, for any economic model under linear preferences.
1While dividing goods, the analogous question is to not allocate a good to any agent who likes it very little. It
can be achieved by setting all the utility values less than or equal to the threshold τ to zero. We can check existence
as well as compute equilibrium in strongly polynomial time [Gal76, DGV16, GV19].
2
1.1 Model and Notation
In this section, we introduce the most general problem of Chore Division and then certain special
variants of it. In an instance of chore division, we have a set A = 〈a1, a2, . . . , an〉 of agents and a
set B = 〈b1, b2, . . . , bm〉 of divisible chores. Each agent ai has some initial endowment of chores.
Let w(ai, bj) denote ai’s endowment of chore bj . Intuitively, agent ai wants w(ai, bj) units of chores
to be done (by herself or other agents in the instance). Also, each agent ai has a linear disutility
function that captures the amount of disutility she has for all possible chores that can be allocated
to her:
∑
j∈[m] d(ai, bj)·Xij , where d(ai, bj) denote the ai’s disutility for one unit of chore bj and Xij
denote the amount of chore bj that agent ai does. For convenience, we also refer to the disutility
function d(·, ·) and the endowment function w(·, ·) as the disutility matrix and endowment matrix
respectively.
Given price vector p = 〈p(b1), p(b2), . . . , p(bm)〉 ∈ Rm≥0, where p(bj) denotes the price of chore bj
(the amount of money that any agent doing one unit of the chore will be paid), agent ai needs to
earn (
∑
j∈[m]w(ai, bj) ·p(bj)) in order to pay to get her own chores done. She can earn this amount
by doing other chores, while minimizing her disutility – this defines her optimal bundle (or optimal
chore set).
• Optimal bundle. For agent ai ∈ A, 〈Xi1, Xi2, . . . , Xim〉 is her optimal bundle if it minimizes∑
j∈[m] d(ai, bj) ·Xij subject to the constraint
∑
j∈[m]Xij · p(bj) ≥
∑
j∈[m]w(ai, bj) · p(bj).
It is easy to see that in her optimal bundle agent ai gets assigned only those chores that
minimizes her disutility per dollar (buck) earned. Formally,
∀j ∈ [m], Xij > 0 ⇒ d(ai,bj)p(bj) ≤
d(ai,bj′ )
p(bj′ )
∀j′ ∈ [m].
Price vector p is said to be at competitive equilibrium (CE) if all chores are completely assigned
when every agent gets her optimal bundle, i.e.,
∑
i∈[n]Xij =
∑
i∈[n]w(ai, bj), ∀j ∈ [m]. Our focus
in this paper is on efficient competitive equilibrium where no agent is assigned a chore for which
her disutility is greater than or equal to a threshold τ . Formally, this problem can be defined as
follows:
Problem 1. (Chore Division)
Given: A set A = 〈a1, a2, . . . , an〉 of agents, set B = 〈b1, b2, . . . , bm〉 of bads/chores, disutility
function d : A×B → (0,∞), an endowment function w : A×B → R≥0, and a threshold τ .
Find: Price vector p = 〈p(b1), p(b2), . . . , p(bm)〉 ∈ Rm≥0 and allocation X ∈ Rn×m≥0 are such that,
1. Xij > 0 only if d(ai, bj) < τ and
d(ai,bj)
p(bj)
≤ d(ai,bj′ )p(bj′ ) for all j
′ ∈ [m],
2.
∑
j∈[m]Xij · p(bj) =
∑
j∈[m]w(ai, bj) · p(bj) for all i ∈ [n], and
3.
∑
i∈[n]Xij =
∑
i∈[n]w(ai, bj) for all j ∈ [m].
A competitive equilibrium is a tuple 〈p,X〉 satisfying the above constraints.
Observe that the equilibrium prices are scale invariant: if p is an equilibrium price vector then
so is α·p for any positive scalar α. Furthermore, at equilibrium p(bj) > 0 for each chore j, otherwise
no agent would be willing to do it.
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Approximate Competitive Equilibrium. For an  > 0, a (1− )-competitive equilibrium is the
tuple 〈p,X〉 that satisfy the first two conditions above, and the third condition approximately:
(1− ) ·
∑
i∈[n]
w(ai, bj) ≤
∑
i∈[n]
Xij ≤ 1
(1− )
∑
i∈[n]
w(ai, bj) for all j ∈ [m].
A competitive equilibrium 〈p,X〉 has many desirable properties like envy-freeness and Pareto
optimality in the chore division with equal earnings [BMSY17]. We briefly mention the similar
properties that a competitive equilibrium satisfies in the context of the more general problem of
chore division.
• Weighted envy freeness: An allocation X is said to be envy free is for every pair of agents
i and i′, agent i’s disutility for her own bundle
∑
j∈[m] d(ai, bj) · Xij is not higher than her
disutility for ai′ ’s bundle:
∑
j∈[m] d(ai, bj) ·Xi′j :∑
j∈[m]
d(ai, bj) ·Xij ≤
∑
j∈[m]
d(ai, bj) ·Xi′j .
Weighted envy freeness is a generalized notion of envy freeness. For any two agents ai and
ai′ , we have that agent ai’s disutility for its own bundle 〈Xi1, . . . , Xim〉, scaled down by the
cost of the chores in her initial endowment is at most as high as her disutility for ai′ ’s optimal
bundle 〈Xi′1, . . . , Xi′m〉 scaled down by the cost of the chores in ai′ ’s initial endowment:∑
j∈[m] d(ai, bj) ·Xij∑
j∈[m]w(ai, bj) · p(j)
≤
∑
j∈[m] d(ai, bj) ·Xi′j∑
j∈[m]w(ai′ , bj) · p(j)
.
Intuitively, a “fair share of disutility” of any agent is the total cost of chores she brings
(her total initial endowment): higher the cost of the chores she brings, larger is her share of
disutility. A competitive equilibrium ensures that every agent ai feels that she receives her
fair share of disutility compared to all other agents.
• Pareto optimality: There is no other allocation Y ∈ Rn×m≥0 such that disutility of all the
agents is at most as high as in X and at least one agent has strictly less disutility in Y , i.e.,∑
j∈[m] d(ai, bj) · Yij ≤
∑
j∈[m] d(ai, bj) ·Xij for all i ∈ [n] with at least one strict inequality.
Analogous to the notion of Fisher model in the scenario where we divide only goods (see [BS05]),
we define the notion of Chore Division with Fixed Earnings, where every agent has to earn a fixed
amount of money by doing chores with minimum disutility to price ratio. While in the chore
division (Definition 1), the amount an agent needs to earn depends on the prices of chores she
owns. It is without loss of generality to assume that one unit of each chore has to be done by
scaling the disutility values appropriately.
Problem 2. (Chore Division with Fixed Earnings)
Given: A set A = 〈a1, a2, . . . , an〉 of agents, set B = 〈b1, b2, . . . , bm〉 of bads/chores, disutility
function d : A×B → (0,∞), and an earning function e : A→ R≥0, and a threshold τ > 0.
Find: Price vector p = 〈p(b1), p(b2), . . . , p(bm)〉 ∈ Rm≥0 and allocation X ∈ Rn×m≥0 such that,
1. Xij > 0 only if d(ai, bj) < τ and
d(ai,bj)
p(bj)
≤ d(ai,bj′ )p(bj′ ) for all j
′ ∈ [m],
2.
∑
j∈[m]Xij · p(bj) = e(ai) for all i ∈ [n], and
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3.
∑
i∈[n]Xij = 1 for all j ∈ [m].
Tuple 〈p,X〉 satisfying the above is a competitive equilibrium.
Analogously a (1− )-CE satisfies (1), (2) as is, and (3) approximately.
Observe that Problem 2 can be modeled as a special case of Problem 1. Given an instance
I = 〈A,B, d(·, ·), e(·)〉 of Problem 2, we can construct an instance I ′ = 〈A,B, d(·, ·), w(·, ·)〉 of
Problem 1 such that w(ai, bj) = e(ai) for all bj ∈ B. Since the equilibrium price vector p =
〈p(b1), p(b2), . . . , p(bm)〉 is scale-invariant, we can assume without loss of generality that
∑
j∈[m] p(bj)
= 1. One can verify now that at every competitive equilibrium of I ′ we have
∑
j∈[m]Xij · p(bj) =∑
j∈[m]w(ai, bj)·p(bj) = e(ai)·
∑
j∈[m] p(bj) = e(ai) for all i ∈ [n]. Since all the other conditions that
need to be satisfied by the equilibrium price vector at I ′ and I are identical, we have that every
competitive equilibrium in I ′ is also a competitive equilibrium in I. Therefore all the hardness
results that apply for chore division with fixed earnings (Problem 2), will automatically apply to
chore division (Problem 1) as well.
Chore Division with Equal Earnings. A special case of Problem 2 (and consequently Prob-
lem 1) is the Chore Division with Equal Earnings where we have e(ai) = 1 for all i ∈ [n]. Analogous
notions to chore division with equal earnings, in the context of goods is Competitive Equilibrium
with Equal Incomes (CEEI) [Var74]. CEEI has been extensively studied in the scenario of dividing
goods in the fair division community.
1.2 Technical Overview
In this section, we sketch the main techniques and ideas used to prove our results in later sections.
1.2.1 NP-Hardness of Checking Existence
We first show that there are very simple instances in chore division that does not admit a competitive
equilibrium.
Example 1. Consider a scenario with two agents a1 and a2, and two chores b1 and b2. We have
w(ai, bj) = 1 for all i, j ∈ [2], and d(a1, b1) = d(a2, b1) = 1, d(a1, b2) = τ  2 and d(a2, b2) = 2.
Let p(b1) and p(b2) be the prices of the chores at a competitive equilibrium. Observe that since
d(a1, b2) = τ , a1 earns her entire money from b1. Therefore, 2 · p(b1) ≥ p(b1) + p(b2), implying that
p(b1) ≥ p(b2). In that case, observe that the disutility to price ratio of b1 is strictly less than that
of b2 for a2:
d(a2,b1)
p(b1)
= 1p(b1) <
2
p(b1)
≤ 2p(b2) =
d(a2,b2)
p(b2)
. Thus, none of the agents is willing to do
chore b2, and therefore it remains unassigned, a contradiction.
Observe that this example is an instance of chore division with equal earnings. It is a natural
question to ask whether an instance admits a competitive equilibrium. In the analogous context
of dividing goods (linear exchange model), there exists polynomial-time verifiable necessary and
sufficient conditions [DGV16] for an instance to admit a competitive equilibrium. However, this
seems not the case for chore division and surprisingly this problem turns out to be intractable. To
this end, we show the first result of our paper,
Theorem 3. Determining whether an instance of chore division with fixed earnings admits a com-
petitive equilibrium is strongly NP-hard.
In fact, we can also show the same hardness for finding an (1112 + δ)-competitive equilibrium for
any δ > 0 for chore division with equal earnings too (all the details of the reduction are presented
in Section 2).
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1.2.2 Instances that Admit a Competitive Equilibrium
Sufficiency Conditions. The hard instances constructed to prove Theorem 3 have similar struc-
ture in disutility matrix as Example 1. In particular, the non-existence is primarily attributed to
the fact that there is a classification of the agents into two groups: rigid and flexible. The rigid
agents have small disutility towards some chores (let us call them easy chores) and have disutility of
τ for some chores (we call them hard chores) while the flexible agents have small disutility towards
the easy chores and high (but still < τ) disutility towards the hard chores. Since the flexible agents
need to do the hard chores entirely, it may not be possible to have a competitive equilibrium, as
the prices of the hard chores need to be high (for them to have small disutility to price ratio) and
sometimes it may be higher than the stipulated/fixed earning2of the flexible agents. Therefore, we
look into instances that do not have such a structure in the disutility matrix; in particular let us
define the disutility graph of an instance as the bipartite graph D = (A ∪ B,ED) containing the
agents A as one vertex set and the chores B as the other, and there exists an edge from agent a ∈ A
to chore b ∈ B if and only if d(a, b) < τ . Our first sufficiency condition is that,
Condition 1: D is a disjoint union of complete bipartite graphs D1, D2, . . . , Dd, for some d ≥ 1.
Observe that if an instance satisfies Condition 1, then there exists no global partitioning of the
agents into groups of rigid and flexible agents: for every pair of agents, the set of chores towards
which they have a disutility of less than τ is either identical or disjoint. We remark that this itself is
a sufficient condition to guarantee the existence of competitive equilibrium in the context of chore
division with fixed earnings (Problem 2): We break the instance into [d] sub-instances formed by
the agents Ai and the chores Bi for all i ∈ [d]. Note that in any competitive equilibria agents in
Ai will not earn any money from the chores in Bi′ for all i 6= i′. Therefore, it suffices to show
that there exists competitive equilibria in each sub instance formed by Ai and Bi for all i ∈ [d].
Bogomolnaia et al. [BMSY17] show that a competitive equilibria always exists in chore division with
fixed earnings if the disutility graph of the instance is a complete bipartite graph. Unfortunately,
this condition alone is not sufficient to guarantee the existence of a competitive equilibrium in the
context of general chore division (Problem 1). Consider the following simple example:
Example 2. We have two agents a1 and a2 and two chores b1 and b2. Let us assume w(a1, b1) = 1,
w(a1, b2) =
1
2 , w(a2, b1) = 0, and w(a2, b2) =
1
2 . Also, suppose d(a1, b1) = d(a2, b2) = 1 and
d(a1, b2) = d(a2, b1) = τ . Note that the disutility graph D is the union of two disjoint complete
bipartite graphs, namely D1 = ({a1} ∪ {b1} , {(a1, b1)}) and D2({a2} ∪ {b2} , {(a2, b2)}). However,
we do not have any competitive equilibrium as the earning of a2 will be half of the price of b2 and
thus a2 can never do more than half of the chore b2. Also, a1 will not do any of chore b2 as she has
disutility of τ for the same. Therefore, b2 can not be fully assigned.
Thus, we need more conditions to guarantee the existence of a competitive equilibrium. To this
end, we define the exchange graph of an instance as a graph W = ([d], EW ). We have (i, j) ∈ EW if
and only if for every chore b in the component Dj of the disutility matrix, there is an agent a ∈ Di
such that w(a, b) > 0 3. We now propose our second sufficiency condition.
Condition 2: W is strongly connected.
With this, we state the second main result of our paper.
Theorem 4. All instances of chore division that satisfy Conditions 1 and 2, admit a competitive
equilibrium.
2the sum of prices of the chores owned by flexible agents in the case of Chore Division (Problem 1).
3Intuitively, agents in the component Dj are willing to do chores brought by the agents in Di.
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Existence under Sufficiency Conditions. We now briefly sketch the ideas behind our proof
of existence (Theorem 4) and also highlight some crucial barriers that we overcome. Like most
equilibrium existence results [Nas51, AD54], our proof uses a fixed-point theorem. Given a function
or a correspondence φ from D to D, a fixed-point theorem ensures existence of x ∈ D such that
f(x) = x or x ∈ f(x) respectively, if φ satisfies continuity-like properties, and D is convex and
compact [Bro11, Kak41].
The known existence proofs in the context of dividing goods, say g1, . . . , gm, defines fixed-point
formulations that operate on a simplex as the domain for price vectors [AD54, Max97]. That is
∆n = {p | p(gj) ≥ 0 for all j ∈ [m], and
∑
j∈[m] p(gj) = 1}. Given prices, it computes optimal
bundles of agents and adjust prices based on excess demand, i.e., demand minus supply.
This approach immediately fails for the chore division problem due to the issue of infeasible
optimal bundle under this price domain. Here is why: Recall at prices p, an optimal bundle of agent
ai minimizes her disutility
∑
j∈[m] d(ai, bj) ·Xij subject to
(a) she earns at least the payment she needs to make for her endowment, i.e.,
∑
j∈[m]Xij ·p(bj) ≥∑
j∈[m]w(ai, bj) · p(bj), and
(b) Xij > 0 only if d(ai, bj) < τ .
Consider a price vector p ∈ ∆n such that for a particular component Dk = (Ak ∪ Bk, Ek) in
the disutility graph we have the price of every chore in Bk to be zero. And, there is an agent
ai ∈ Ak such that
∑
j∈[m]w(ai, bj) ·p(bj) > 0. Note that the optimal bundle set for ai is empty here
since under condition (b) above, condition (a) becomes infeasible. That is, all the chores where
ai has a disutility of less than τ have zero prices and thus ai will never be able to earn enough
money to match
∑
j∈[m]w(ai, bj) · p(bj). This issue does not arise in the goods only case because
there condition (a) becomes “agent spends only as much as she earns from her endowment” which
essentially puts an upper bound on her spending reversing the inequality, and then all Xij ’s being
0 is always feasible.
In order to avoid the issue of “zero prices”, we add more constraints to domain of the price vec-
tors. The domain of our fixed-point formulation is defined by the price vectors p = 〈p(b1), . . . , p(bm)〉
(where each p(bj) is the price of the chore bj) and allocations X = 〈X11, X12, . . . , Xnm〉 (where each
Xij ≥ 0 indicates the consumption of chore bj by agent ai) such that,
• p(bj) ≥ 0 for all j ∈ [m], and
∑
j∈[m] p(bj) = 1, and
• ∑ai∈Ak∑j∈[m]w(ai, bj) · p(bj) = ∑bj∈Bk p(bj) for each connected component Dk = (Ak ∪
Bk, Ek) of the disutility graph, and
• for all i, j, we have 0 ≤ Xij ≤M for some sufficiently large M .
Let P denote the set of all prices and X denote the set of all allocations that satisfy the above
conditions. First observe that for any p ∈ P we cannot have all prices of a component Dk of the
disutility graph to be zero: Without loss of generality, let us assume that the sum of prices of the
chores in the components Dk for all k ∈ [`] are zero and the sum of prices of the chores in all other
components (Dk for all k ∈ [d] \ [`]) are non-zero. Note that since
∑
j∈[m] p(bj) = 1, there is at
least one component where the sum of prices of the chores is non-zero and thus [d] \ [`] 6= ∅. Also,
note that for all k ∈ [`] we have ∑ai∈Ak∑j∈[m]w(ai, bj) · p(bj) = ∑bj∈Bk p(bj) = 0 (by the third
constraint in the definition of P ). Since our instance satisfies Condition 2, we have that there exists
an edge in the exchange graph W = ([d], EW ) from a k ∈ [`] to a k′ ∈ [d] \ [`]. This implies that for
each chore in Dk′ (in particular for the chore with a non-zero price), there exists an agent in Dk with
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some positive endowment of that chore, further implying that
∑
ai∈Ak
∑
j∈[m]w(ai, bj) · p(bj) > 0,
which is a contradiction. Therefore, we cannot have all the prices of any component Dk in the
disutility graph to be zero. This resolves the issue of “zero prices” and thereby ensures feasibility
of the optimal bundle sets (Lemma 21). Now the crucial task is to define a “continuous” map that
maintains the extra conditions on the price space.
Let S = ∪p∈P ∪X∈X 〈p,X〉. In order to capture competitive equilibria at fixed-points we define
a correspondence φ : S → 2S that satisfies the following properties: it maps any 〈p,X〉 to all 〈q,Xp〉
where,
• the price vector q is such that q ∈ P and for all components Dk = (Ak ∪ Bk, Ek) of the
disutility graph, we have
q(bj)
q(bj′)
=
p(bj) + max (
∑
i∈[n]w(ai, bj)−
∑
i∈[n]Xij , 0)
p(bj′) + max (
∑
i∈[n]w(ai, bj′)−
∑
i∈[n]Xij′ , 0)
, (1)
for all chores bj and bj′ in Bk.
• Xp ∈ X is an optimal bundle set at the prices p: For every agent ai, we have 〈Xpi1, . . . , Xpim〉
to be the optimal demand bundle for ai at prices p, if and only if, 〈Xpi1, . . . , Xpim〉 minimizes
the total disutility
∑
j∈[m] d(ai, bj) ·Xpi,j of agent ai subject to
– Xpij > 0 only if d(ai, bj) < τ , and
– the earning constraint
∑
j∈[m]X
p
ij · p(bj) ≥
∑
j∈[m]w(ai, bj) · p(bj).
At the first glance, it may not even be clear that why such a correspondence can be defined:
In particular, finding the price vector q that satisfies the properties as mentioned above. However,
we do manage to construct such a correspondence φ and show that it has at least one fixed-point
in Section 3. Before we sketch the construction, let us first discuss how the above properties are
important to show that the fixed-points of φ correspond to competitive equilibrium.
Consider any fixed point of φ, i.e., 〈p,X〉 such that 〈p,X〉 ∈ φ(〈p,X〉). Let rj(X) denote the
amount of chore bj left undone under X, i.e., rj(X) = max (
∑
i∈[n]w(ai, bj) −
∑
i∈[n]Xij , 0). We
have q = p and Xp = X, where q and Xp are constructed from p and X as above. Thus, every agent
earns her money from the chores in her optimal bundle (as X = Xp) and if Xp is not a competitive
equilibrium, then the only reason is because some chore bj is not completed, i.e., rj(X) > 0.
This also implies that there is some chore bj′ that is overdone (
∑
i∈[n]w(ai, bj′) −
∑
i∈[n]Xij′ < 0,
implying rj′(X) = 0), as the total earning of the agents is at least the total prices of the chores
(by the definition of Xp). Therefore, we have
q(bj)
q(bj′ )
=
p(bj)+rj(X)
p(bj′ )+rj′ (X)
>
p(bj)
p(bj′ )+rj′ (X)
=
p(bj)
p(bj′ )
, implying
that q 6= p, which is a contradiction.
Now, the main challenge (and also the main bulk of our effort) is to show that such a corre-
spondence φ can be defined. That is, to get the price vector q ∈ Rm≥0 that satisfy the ratio property
as outlined in (1), and all the constraints that define the price space P , especially the constraint
that for every component Dk in the disutility graph, the total price of chores owned by the agents
in Ak equals the total price of the chores in Bk. For this, we first compute q
′(bj)’s that satisfy the
ratio property, but may not be in price space P . Then, for each component taking its total price
as a variable, we define parameterized q from q′ that preserves price ratios of q′. Now the goal is
to find values of the variables once we replace them in q we get q ∈ P . In other words, q satisfy all
the component-wise price constraints of domain P .
This condition essentially gives a linear system of equations. Let M ∈ Rd×d denote the matrix
of this linear system. Then, our goal becomes to find a non-negative vector v ∈ Rd in the null
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space of M . It is not obvious why such a vector should exist. Our high-level approach to show
the same is as follows: We can equivalently express the linear system of equations M · v = 0 as
M ′ ·v = v, where M ′ = M + I, where I is the identity matrix. We show that if we define a function
f : Rd → Rd as f(v) = M ′ · v, then f maps the d-dimensional simplex ∆d to itself. Restricting f
to only the simplex, we get a continuous map f : ∆d → ∆d and therefore it has a fixed-point by
the Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem. At every fixed-point v we have M ′ · v = v implying M · v = 0.
Since v ∈ ∆d, we get the vector we needed.
Finally, to apply the Kakutani’s fixed point theorem, we need to show that our correspondence
has a closed graph (analogous to continuity for a function) and φ(〈p,X〉) is non-empty and convex.
Since defining the correspondence involves multiple steps, this does not follow trivially. Once we
prove this in Lemma 33 in Section 3, we get the existence of a fixed-point of φ, and thereby the
existence of a competitive equilibrium. We refer the reader to Section 3 for a detailed formal
discussion.
1.2.3 Hardness of Determining Equilibrium under Sufficiency Conditions
Recall from Section 1.2.2 that the NP-hardness of Chore division crucially uses the structure of
rigid and flexible agents. However, this structure in the disutility matrix is completely removed if
we concentrate on instances satisfying Conditions 1 and 2, mentioned in Section 1.2.2. We show
that even under these sufficiency conditions, chore division is still intractable. We now mention our
third main technical result:
Theorem 5. Chore division, restricted to all instances that satisfy Conditions 1 and 2, is PPAD-
hard.
We show the PPAD-hardness by reduction from normalized polymatrix game (defined below),
which is known to be PPAD-hard [CPY17].
Problem 6. (Normalized Polymatrix Game) [CPY17]
Given: A 2n × 2n rational matrix M with every entry in [0, 1] and Mi,2j−1 + Mi,2j = 1 for all
i ∈ [2n] and j ∈ [n] .
Find: Equilibrium strategy vector x ∈ R2n≥0 such that x2i−1 + x2i = 1 and
xT ·M∗,2i−1 > xT ·M∗,2i + 1n =⇒ x2i = 0.
xT ·M∗,2i > xT ·M∗,2i−1 + 1n =⇒ x2i−1 = 0.
where M∗,k represents the kth column of the matrix M.
Given an instance I = 〈M〉 of the polymatrix game, we will now create an instance of chore
division E(I) = 〈A∪B, d(·, ·), w(·, ·)〉 such that given any competitive equilibrium in E(I), we can
determine in polynomial time, an equilibrium strategy vector x for I. We note that our reduction
can be extended to work even in the restricted setting of (1− 1poly(n))-competitive equilibria. How-
ever, for simplicity we stick to the exact competitive equilibria in our reduction. Next, we give a
brief sketch of the proof, while the formal proof with all the details is in Section 4.
Sketch of the Reduction. The key properties that our hard instance E(I) exhibit are pairwise
equal endowments, fixed earning, price equality, price regulation and reverse ratio amplification (we
will give a precise definition of these properties shortly). These techniques (constructing hard in-
stances exhibiting these properties) have been used earlier to prove PPAD-hardness for the exchange
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model with only goods when agents have constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utilities [CPY17]
and even for the Fisher model when agents have separable piecewise linear concave (SPLC) util-
ities [CT09]. However, in the context of chore division, we are able to obtain these gadgets (in
particular the reverse ratio-amplification gadget) even when agents have linear disutility functions
(dividing goods when agents have linear utility functions is tractable).
We now give a brief overview of the reduction: Let us consider two sets of chores, namely
B1 =
{
b11, b
1
2, . . . , b
1
2n
}
and B2 =
{
b21, b
2
2, . . . , b
2
2n
}
. For all i, j ∈ [2n] we define agents ai,j such that
agent ai,j brings Mi,j units of chore b
2
i . The disutilities are as follows:
d(ai,2j−1, b12j−1) = (1− α) and d(ai,2j−1, b12j) = (1 + α)
d(ai,2j , b
1
2j−1) = (1 + α) and d(ai,2j , b
1
2j) = (1− α),
for some infinitesimally small α > 0. Agents ai,2j−1 and ai,2j have disutility more than τ for all
other chores. Our instance also has agents a′1, a′2, . . . a′2n such that for each i ∈ [2n], we have,
d(a′2i−1, b
1
2i−1) = (1− α) and d(a′2i−1, b12i) = (1 + α)
d(a′2i, b
1
2i−1) = (1 + α) and d(a
′
2i, b
1
2i) = (1− α).
Our instance E(I) of chore division has additional agents and chores to ensure the following five
crucial properties at equilibrium, however, none of the other agents in E(I) have disutility less than
τ towards the chores in B1.
• Pairwise equal endowments: In E(I), the total endowment of chore bk2i−1 equals the total
endowment of chore bk2i for all k ∈ [2]. Also the total endowments of each chore is O(n).
• Fixed earning: In any competitive equilibrium, for each i ∈ [2n], we have the total earning of
agent a′i is (1− β) · (2n−
∑
j∈[2n] Mj,i).
• Price equality: In any competitive equilibrium, the sum of prices of chores bk2i−1 and bk2i is
the same for all i ∈ [n] and k ∈ [2]. Since the prices of chores at a competitive equilibrium is
scale invariant, we can assume further, without loss of generality, that for all i ∈ [n], we have
p(b12i−1) + p(b
1
2i) = p(b
2
2i−1) + p(b
2
2i) = 2.
• Price regulation: In any competitive equilibrium, for all i ∈ [2n] we have
1− α
1 + α
≤ p(b
1
2i−1)
p(b12i)
≤ 1 + α
1− α and
1− β
1 + β
≤ p(b
2
2i−1)
p(b22i)
≤ 1 + β
1− β ,
for some infinitesimally small β  n2 · α.
• Reverse ratio amplification: In any competitive equilibrium, for all i ∈ [2n], if p(b
1
2i−1)
p(b12i)
= 1+α1−α ,
then we have
p(b22i−1)
p(b22i)
= 1−β1+β and similarly when
p(b12i−1)
p(b12i)
= 1−α1+α , then we have
p(b22i−1)
p(b22i)
= 1+β1−β .
Our instance E(I) satisfies both Conditions 1 and 2 of Section 3. As a result, it admits a
competitive equilibrium. Given that a competitive equilibrium has to satisfy the above properties,
we now show how we can use prices at the competitive equilibrium to obtain a Nash equilibrium
strategy vector for the polymatrix game in polynomial time. Given a competitive equilibrium price
vector p, construct vector x as follows.
∀i ∈ [2n], xi = p(b
2
i )− (1− β)
2 · β
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We will now show that x is the desired Nash equilibrium strategy vector for instance I of the
polymatrix game, i.e., it satisfies conditions of Problem 6. To this end, first observe that since our
instance satisfies price equality we have that p(b22i−1) + p(b
2
2i) = 2 for all i ∈ [n]. Again, since our
instance satisfies price regulation, we also have for all i ∈ [n], 1−β1+β ≤
p(b22i−1)
p(b22i)
≤ 1+β1−β , implying that
p(bki ) ≥ 1− β for all i ∈ [2n]. Therefore, xi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ [2n].
Also note that we have x2i−1 + x2i =
p(b22i−1)+p(b
2
2i)−2(1−β)
2·β =
2β
2β = 1 (by the price equality
property we have p(b22i−1) + p(b
2
2i) = 2) for all i ∈ [n]. Now, we show that if xT · M∗,2i >
xT ·M∗,2i−1 + 1n , then x2i−1 = 0. The proof for the symmetric condition is similar. Let us assume
that xT ·M∗,2i > xT ·M∗,2i−1 + 1n . Observe that the agents that have a disutility of (1−α) towards
chore b12i are
{∪j∈[2n]aj,2i} ∪ a′2i, and that their total earning is
=
∑
j∈[2n]
Mj,2i · p(b2j ) + (1− β) · (2n−
∑
j∈[2n]
Mj,2i) (fixed earning)
=
∑
j∈[2n]
Mj,2i · (2β · xj + (1− β)) + (1− β) · (2n−
∑
j∈[2n]
Mj,2i) (substituting p(b
2
j ))
=
∑
j∈[2n]
2β · xj ·Mj,2i + (1− β) ·
∑
j∈[2n]
Mj,2i + (1− β) · (2n−
∑
j∈[2n]
Mj,2i)
= 2βxT ·M∗,2i + 2n · (1− β).
Similarly, the total earning of the agents that have a disutility of (1 − α) towards b12i−1 is
2βxT ·M∗,2i−1 + 2n · (1− β). Observe that the agents with disutility (1− α) towards b12i can earn
all their money only from either b12i or b
1
2i−1 (as these are the only chores towards which they have
finite disutility). Also note that the total endowment of both b12i−1 and b
1
2i is cn for some c ∈ O(1)
(as our instance also satisfies pairwise equal endowments). Now if, the agents
{∪j∈[2n]aj,2i} ∪ a′2i
earn their money entirely from b12i, then we will have p(b
1
2i) ≥ 1cn · (2βxT ·M∗,2i + 2n · (1 − β))
and p(b12i−1) ≤ 1cn · (2βxT ·M∗,2i−1 + 2n · (1 − β)). Since, xT ·M∗,2i > xT ·M∗,2i−1 + 1n . we have
p(b12i) > p(b
1
2i−1) +
1
n · 2cnβ = 2βcn2 . Again, since β  n2 · α, we have that
p(b12i)
p(b12i−1)
> 1+α1−α , which is
a contradiction, as our construction satisfies the price regulation property. Therefore, the agents
that have a disutility of (1 − α) towards b12i should also earn some positive units of money from
b12i−1. But this is only possible if
p(b12i)
p(b12i−1)
= 1−α1+α . Since our instance also satisfies the reverse ratio
amplification property, we have that
p(b22i)
p(b22i−1)
= 1+β1−β . Since p(b
2
2i) + p(b
2
2i−1) = 2 by price equality
property, we have that p(b22i−1) = 1− β. Therefore we have,
x2i−1 =
(1− β)− (1− β)
2 · β
= 0.
A very similar argument shows that when xT ·M∗,2i−1 > xT ·M∗,2i + 1n , then x2i = 0. A more
elaborate discussion of the proof, where we give complete construction and prove that the instance
exhibits all the properties, is in Section 4.
1.3 Further Related Work
The fair division literature is too vast to survey here, so we refer to the excellent books [BT96,
RW98, Mou03] and a recent survey article [Mou19], and restrict attention to previous work that
appears most relevant.
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Most of the work in fair division is focused on allocating goods with a few exceptions of
chores [Su99, AS14, BT96, RW98]. Recent seminal papers of Bogomolnaia et al. [BMSY17, BMSY19]
consider the case of mixed manna that contains both goods and bads. For the goods case, com-
petitive equilibrium maximizes the Nash welfare, i.e., geometric mean of agents’ utilities. In case
of chores (or mixed manna), [BMSY17] shows that critical points of the geometric mean of agents’
disutilities on the (Pareto) efficiency frontier are the competitive equilibrium profiles.
The fair allocation of indivisible items is also an intensely studied problem for the case when all
items are goods with a few recent exceptions [ARSW17, ACL19b, HL19, ACL19a, ACIW19, SS19].
Since the standard notions of fairness such as envy-freeness are not applicable, alternate notions
have been defined and studied for this case; see [LMMS04, Bud11, CKM+16, PR18, CGM20,
GHS+18, GKK20] for a subset of notable work and references therein. The Nash welfare continues
to serve as a major focal point in this case as well, for which approximation algorithms have
been obtained under several classes of utility functions including linear [CG15, CDG+17, AGSS17,
AMGV18, BKV18, GHM18, CCG+18].
Organization of the Paper. We present our three main results in the upcoming sections.
Section 2 contains the NP-hardness of chore division with fixed earnings (and equal earnings).
Section 3 contains the sufficiency conditions under which a competitive equilibrium always exists
and the proof of existence. Finally, Section 4 contains the PPAD-hardness of finding a competitive
allocation even under the sufficiency conditions.
2 Complexity of Determining Existence of Efficient Equilibrium
In this section, we show that finding a (1112 + δ)-competitive equilibrium for any δ > 0 in chore
division with fixed earnings (Problem 2) and consequently chore division (Problem 1) is strongly
NP-hard. Later, in the section we also show how to modify our instance to obtain NP-hardness for
finding a (1112 +δ)-competitive equilibrium even in chore division with equal earnings. We show that
any polynomial time algorithm that determines whether an instance admits a (1112 + δ)-competitive
equilibrium in chore division with fixed earnings implies that 3-SAT is solvable in polynomial time.
To this end, we recall the 3-SAT problem:
Problem 7. (3-SAT)
Given: A set of variables X = {x1, x2, . . . , xn} and a set of clauses C = {C1, C2, . . . , Cm} where
each clause is a disjunction of exactly three literals4.
Find: An assignment A : X → {T, F} such that all the clauses are satisfied5 or output that no
such assignment exists.
Given any instance I = 〈X,C〉 of 3-SAT, we will create an instance E(I) of chore division
such that there exists an efficient competitive equilibrium in E(I) if and only if there exists an
assignment A that satisfies all the clauses in C in I. We first briefly sketch the intuition, before we
move to the construction of the gadgets required for our reduction.
Several Disconnected Equilibria. We sketch a very simple scenario that could arise in chore
division with fixed earnings: Consider an instance with two agents a1 and a2 with a fixed earning
of one unit each. The disutility values are given below where a1 has a disutility of 1 for b1 and 3
for b2, while a2 has a disutility of τ for b1 and 1 for b2.
4A literal is a variable or the negation of a variable
5A clause Cr = `1 ∨ `2 ∨ `3 (`i is a literal) is satisfied if and only if A(`i) = T for at least one i ∈ [3].
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b1 b2
a1 1 3
a2 τ 1
Let p = 〈p(b1), p(b2)〉 be an equilibrium price vector. Also, throughout this section we use the
notation MPBa to denote the minimum pain per buck bundle for agent a at the prices p: a chore
b ∈ MPBa if and only if d(a,b)p(b) ≤ d(a,b
′)
p(b′) for all other chores b
′ in the instance. Observe that this
small instance exhibits exactly two competitive equilibria:
• The first competitive equilibrium is when both p(b1) and p(b2) are set to 1. Note that only
MPBa1 = {b1} and MPBa2 = {b2}. Thus a1 earns her entire one unit of money from g1 and
a2 earns her entire one unit of money from g2.
• The second competitive equilibrium is when a1 earns from both b1 and b2. For this we set
p(b1) to 1/2 and p(b2) to 3/2. Note that MPBa1 = {b1, b2} and MPBa2 = {b2}. Under these
prices, a2 earns her entire money by doing 2/3 of b2, and a1 earns her money by doing all of
b1 and 1/3 of b2.
Also, observe that there exists no competitive equilibrium at any other set of prices (in particular
all price vectors that can be expressed as a convex combination of (1,1) and (1/2,3/2)). This is
a striking difference to the scenario with only goods to divide, where all competitive equilibrium
exists at a unique price vector. Now, let us introduce another agent a3 and another chore b3 in
the instance. Let us say that a3 has a fixed earning of one unit, and both agents a1 and a2 have a
disutility of τ towards b3. We now discuss two scenarios that may arise depending on a3’s disutility
towards the chores
1. a3 has a disutility of 1 towards b3 and b2 and τ towards b1.
2. a3 has a disutility of 1 towards b3,
1
2 towards b1 and τ towards b2.
We will now show that, at a competitive equilibrium, in the first scenario b2 /∈ MPBa1 and in
the second scenario b2 ∈ MPBa1 , suggesting that we need to carefully choose the local equilibrium
among the agents a1, a2 and chores b1 and b2. Let p(b1), p(b2) and p(b3) denote the prices of chores
at an equilibrium. Note that since both a1 and a2 have a disutility of τ for b3, they only earn
money from b1 and b2. Thus p(b1) + p(b2) ≥ 2. Note that in both scenarios b3 should be in MPBa3
as a3 is the only agent with disutility less than τ towards it. Now,
• In the first scenario, we need to have d(a3,b3)p(b3) ≤
d(a3,b3)
p(b3)
or equivalently 1p(b3) ≤ 1p(b2) , implying
that p(b3) ≥ p(b2). This in turn implies that
p(b2) + 2 ≤ p(b2) + (p(b1) + p(b2)) (as p(b1) + p(b2) ≥ 2)
≤ p(b1) + p(b2) + p(b3) (as p(b2) ≤ p(b3))
= 3.
Thus we have p(b2) ≤ 1, implying that p(b1) ≥ 1. Therefore, we can conclude that b2 /∈ MPBa1
as the disutility to price ratio of b1 is strictly less than that of b2 for agent a1.
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• In the second scenario, we need to have d(a3,b3)p(b3) ≤
d(a3,b1)
p(b1)
, we have 1p(b3) ≤ 12p(b1) , implying
that p(b3) ≥ 2p(b1). This in turn implies that
2p(b1) + 2 ≤ 2p(b1) + (p(b1) + p(b2)) (as p(b1) + p(b2) ≥ 2)
≤ p(b1) + p(b2) + p(b3) (as 2p(b1) ≤ p(b3))
= 3.
Thus we have p(b1) ≤ 12 , implying that p(b2) ≥ 32 . Therefore, we conclude that b2 ∈ MPBa1 .
Thus, as mentioned earlier, depending on the valuations of the agents outside the local sub-
instance, a careful selection of the local equilibrium (among the two disjoint local equilibria) among
the agents a1, a2 and chores b1 and b2 is necessary. We will now show that when there are n such
local sub-instances (resulting in 2n disjoint equilibria), choosing the correct combination of the local
equilibria becomes intractable.
2.1 Variable Gadgets
For each variable xi, we introduce two agents a
i
1 and a
i
2 and two chores b
i
1 and b
i
2. We set
d(ai1, b
i
1) = 1, d(a
i
1, b
i
2) = 3,
d(ai2, b
i
1) = τ, d(a
i
2, b
i
2) = 1.
See Figure 1 for an illustration. We set the earnings of both ai1 and a
i
2 to be one, i.e., e(a
i
1) =
e(ai2) = 1. Also, for all i ∈ [n] agents ai1 and ai2 have a disutility of τ for all other goods in the
instance (that have been introduced and will be introduced by clause gadgets in the next section).
2.2 Clause Gadgets
For each clause Cr = (`i∨`j∨`k), where `i is either the variable xi or its negation ¬xi, we introduce
four agents nri , n
r
j , n
r
k and n
r, and three chores mri , m
r
j , and m
r
k. We define the disutility of the
agents as follows: For each literal `i, if
• `i = xi, then,
d(nri , b
i
2) = 1 and d(n
r
i ,m
r
i ) = ε
d(nr, bi2) = 1 and d(n
r,mri ) = ε.
for some 0 < ε 1, but 1ε ∈ O(1).
• `i = ¬xi, then,
d(nri , b
i
1) =
2
3 and d(n
r
i ,m
r
i ) =
4ε
3
d(nr, bi1) =
2
3 and d(n
r,mri ) =
4ε
3 .
For all other agents and chores pair, the disutility is τ . See Figure 1 for an illustration. We set
e(nri ) = e(n
r
j) = e(n
r
k) = ε and e(n
r) = #(Cr) · ( ε2) + #(Cr) · (ε)− ε′, where #(Cr) is the number
of literals in Cr that are not negations of variables and #(Cr) is the number of literals in Cr that
are negations of variables 6, and ε′ < ε2 (the exact value of ε
′ will depend on δ 7 and will be made
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3
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bk2
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r
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r
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r
i
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r
kε
4ε
3
ε
1
2
3 1
nr
ε
4ε
3
ε
1
2
3
1
Figure 1: Illustration of the variable gadgets corresponding to xi, xj and xk, and the clause gadget
Cr = (xi ∨ ¬xj ∨ xk). The red squared nodes represent the agents and the green circle nodes
represent the chores. Only disutility values less than τ have been indicated. The disutility edges
from agents in the variable gadgets are outlined by blue edges. The disutility edges from agents
nr` for ` ∈ {i, j, k} are outlined by orange edges and the disutility edges from agent nr are outlined
by black edges. Thicker disutility edges have a higher disutility than the thinner disutility edges of
the same color.
clear in the proof of Lemma 10). We make a small claim about the total earning requirements for
the agents nri , n
r
j , n
r
k and n
r.
Claim 8. For each clause Cr = `i ∨ `j ∨ `k in I, we have e(nri ) + e(nrj) + e(nrk) + e(nr) = #(Cr) ·
(3ε2 ) + #(Cr) · (2ε)− ε′
Proof. We have,
e(nri ) + e(n
r
j) + e(n
r
k) + e(n
r) = 3ε+ #(Cr) · ( ε2) + #(Cr) · (ε)− ε′
= (#(Cr) + #(Cr))ε+ #(Cr) · ( ε2) + #(Cr) · (ε)− ε′
= #(Cr) · (3ε2 ) + #(Cr) · (2ε)− ε′
We now show how to map any allocation in E(I) to an assignment of variables in I. Consider any
earning f under some prices p in E(I). If agent i does Xij amount of chore j, then f(i, j) = Xij ·p(j).
If agent ai1 does some of chore b
i
2, i.e., f(a
i
1, b
i
2) > 0, then we set xi to F and if f(a
i
1, b
i
2) = 0, then
we set xi to T .
We now make some basic observations.
Observation 9. Let p be the prices of chores and f the the money allocation corresponding to a
competitive equilibrium in E(I). Consider any clause Cr = (`i ∨ `j ∨ `k). Then,
1. if `i = xi and f(a
i
1, b
i
2) > 0 then p(m
r
i ) ≥ 3ε2 , and
2. if `i = ¬xi and f(ai1, bi2) = 0, then p(mri ) ≥ 2ε.
6This implies that #(Cr) + #(Cr) = 3
7Reminder to what δ is: recall that we are trying to show the hardness of determining whether an instance admits
a ( 11
12
+ δ)-competitive equilibrium or not.
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Proof. We first prove part 1. If f(ai1, b
i
2) > 0, then b
i
2 ∈ MPBai1 , implying that
d(ai1,b
i
2)
p(bi2)
≤ d(ai1,bi1)
p(bi1)
.
Therefore, we have that p(bi2) ≥ d(a
i
1,b
i
2)
d(ai1,b
i
1)
· p(bi1) = 3p(bi1). Also, note that since agents ai1 and ai2
have disutility less than τ only for chores bi1 and b
i
2, they will only earn from chores b
i
1 and b
i
2. This
implies that p(bi1) + p(b
i
2) ≥ e(ai1) + e(ai2) = 2. Also, since p(bi2) ≥ 3p(bi1) we have that p(bi2) ≥ 32 .
Now, observe that the only agents who have disutility less than τ towards mri are the agents n
r
i and
nr. Since `i = xi, both n
r
i and n
r have a disutility of 1 towards bi2 and ε towards m
r
i . Therefore,
for mri to be in either MPBnri or MPBnr , we need
ε
p(mri )
≤ 1
p(bi2)
≤ 23 . This implies that p(mri ) ≥ 3ε2 .
The proof of part 2 is very similar. Note that agent ai1 has disutility less than τ for only chores
bi1 and b
i
2. If f(a
i
1, b
i
2) = 0, then she only earns by doing chore b
i
1, implying that p(b
i
1) ≥ e(ai1) = 1.
Similar to the proof in part 1, observe that the only agents who have disutility less than τ towards
mri are the agents n
r
i and n
r. Since `i = ¬xi, both nri and nr have a disutility of 23 towards bi1 and
4ε
3 towards m
r
i . Therefore, for m
r
i to be in either MPBnri or MPBnr , we need
4ε
3p(mri )
≤ 2
3p(bi1)
≤ 23
(as p(b1i ) ≥ 1). This implies that p(mri ) ≥ 2ε.
Lemma 10. If there is no satisfying assignment to the instance I = 〈X,C〉 of 3-SAT, then E(I)
does not admit any (1112 + δ)-competitive equilibrium for any δ > 0.
Proof. We prove by contradiction. Assume otherwise and let p be the equilibrium prices of chores
and f be the corresponding money allocation. Recall the mapping from an equilibrium allocation to
the assignment of variables: For each i ∈ [n] if f(ai1, bi2) > 0, then we set xi to F and if f(ai1, bi2) = 0,
then we set xi to T . Since I admits no satisfying assignment, there exists a clause Cr = `i ∨ `j ∨ `k
which is unsatisfied. For every literal `i ∈ Cr such that `i = xi, note that xi is F . Therefore, we
have that f(ai1, b
i
2) > 0. This implies that p(m
r
i ) ≥ 3ε2 (by Observation 9). Similarly for every literal
`i in Cr such that `i = ¬xi, note that xi is T . Therefore, we have that f(ai1, bi2) = 0, implying that
p(mri ) ≥ 2ε (by Observation 9). We write the price of chore mri , p(mri ) as 3ε2 + δ(mri ) if `i = xi
and 2ε + δ(mri ) if `i = ¬xi, where δ(mri ) is the deviation of the price of mri from its lower bound.
Therefore, we have p(mri ) + p(m
r
j) + p(m
r
k) = #(Cr) · (3ε2 ) + #(Cr) · (2ε) + δ(mri ) + δ(mrj) + δ(mrk).
Note that the only agents who have disutility less than τ for chores mri , m
r
j and m
r
k are the
agents nri , n
r
j , n
r
k and n
r. However, by Claim 8, we have that e(nri ) + e(n
r
j) + e(n
r
k) + e(n
r) =
#(Cr) · (3ε2 ) + #(Cr) · (2ε) − ε′ which is strictly less that the sum of prices of chores mri , mrj and
mrk. In particular we have,
∑
h∈{i,j,k} p(m
r
h) − (
∑
h∈{i,j,k} e(n
r
h) + e(n
r)) = ε′ +
∑
h∈{i,j,k} δ(m
r
h).
Therefore, there exists at least one chore mrh′ such that the difference between the total price of
the chore and the total money earned from the chore by the agents is
ε′+
∑
h∈{i,j,k} δ(m
r
h)
3 ≥
ε′+δ(mr
h′ )
3 .
Thus, the portion of chore mrh′ left undone is at least,
=
ε′+δ(mr
h′ )
3·p(mr
h′ )
≥ ε
′+δ(mr
h′ )
3·(2ε+δ(mr
h′ ))
(as p(mrh′) is either
3ε
2 + δ(m
r
h′) or 2ε+ δ(m
r
h′))
≥ ε′3·(2ε) (as ε′ <
ε
2
).
Since our reduction works for any choice of ε′ < ε2 , we can choose an ε
′ such that ε
′
(6ε) >
1
12 − δ,
implying that we do not have a (1112 + δ)-competitive equilibrium, which is a contradiction.
Lemma 11. If there exists a satisfying assignment to the instance I = 〈X,C〉 of 3-SAT, then E(I)
admits a competitive equilibrium.
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Proof. Consider any satisfying assignment in I. We now show how to construct the prices p and
the money allocation f corresponding to a competitive allocation. We will ensure that only the
agents in the variable gadgets earn from the chores in the variable gadgets and the agents in the
clause gadgets earn only from the chores in the clause gadgets.
Prices and Allocation of Chores in Variable Gadgets. For each variable xi,
• If xi = T , then we set p(bi1) = 1 and p(bi2) = 1.
• If xi = F , then we set p(bi1) = 12 and p(bi2) = 32 .
Since the agents in the variable gadgets have disutility less than τ only for some goods in the variable
gadgets (and have disutility of τ for every good in the clause gadget) we can already define their
optimal bundles (MPB bundles). If xi = T , then observe that MPBai1
=
{
bi1
}
and MPBai2
=
{
bi2
}
.
Thus agent ai1 earns 1 unit of money from doing chore b
i
1 entirely and agent a
i
2 earns 1 unit of money
by doing chore bi2 entirely. When xi = F , then observe that MPBai1
=
{
bi1, b
i
2
}
and MPBai2
=
{
bi2
}
.
Thus agent ai1 earns 1 unit of money from doing chore b
i
1 entirely and b
i
2 partly and agent a
i
2 earns
1 unit of money by doing chore bi2 partly. Now we make an immediate, simple observation:
Observation 12. When xi = T , then f(a
i
1, b
i
2) = 0 and when xi = F , we have f(a
i
1, b
i
2) > 0.
Observe that all the local sub-instances corresponding to the variable gadgets have cleared. It
suffices to show that there exists a competitive equilibrium for local sub-instances corresponding
to the clause gadgets. We now look into the agents and chores in the clause gadget.
Prices and Allocation of Chores in Clause Gadgets. Consider a clause Cr = `i ∨ `j ∨ `k.
Therefore, let Sr ⊆ {`i, `j , `k} be the literals that evaluate to T 8 and Ur ⊆ {`i, `j , `k} be the set
of literals that evaluate to F under the assignment X. Since X is a satisfying assignment, at least
one of the literals will evaluate to T and thus |Sr| ≥ 1 and |Ur| ≤ 2. Let #(Sr) and #(Ur) be the
number of literals in Sr and Ur respectively that are not negations of variables and similarly let
#(Sr) and #(Ur) be the number of literals that are negations of variables in Sr and Ur respectively.
Let αr be a scalar such that
αr · (#(Ur) · 3ε2 + #(Ur) · (2ε)) = |Ur| · ε+ e(nr) (2)
We now set the prices of the chores in the clause gadgets. Consider any clause Cr = `i ∨ `j ∨ `k in
I (with Sr and Ur defined appropriately). For every literal `θ ∈ Sr, set,
p(mrθ) =

ε if `θ = ¬xθ,
ε if `θ = xθ and Ur 6= ∅,
ε+ e(n
r)
#(Sr)
if `θ = xθ and Ur = ∅.
For every `θ ∈ Ur, set
p(mrθ) =
{
αr · (3ε2 ) if `θ = xθ
αr · (2ε) if `θ = ¬xθ.
We will now show that under the above prices for the chores in the clause gadgets, we can
determine a money flow where all the clause agents earn all of their money from their optimal
bundles and all the clause chores will be completed. We distinguish two cases, depending on
whether Ur = ∅ or not,
8A literal `i = xi evaluates to T if xi is set to T and the literal `i = ¬xi evaluates to T when xi is set to F .
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Case Ur 6= ∅: In this case, we first observe that αr is strictly larger than 1:
Observation 13. We have well defined scalar αr > 1.
Proof. Since we are in the case where Ur 6= 0, we have #(Ur) · 3ε2 + #(Ur) · (2ε) > 0, thus αr is well
defined. For the claim of the lemma, it suffices to show that |Ur|·ε+e(nr) > #(Ur)· 3ε2 +#(Ur)·(2ε).
To this end,
|Ur| · ε+ e(nr) = (#(Ur) + #(Ur)) · ε+ e(nr)
= (#(Ur) + #(Ur)) · ε+ #(Cr) · ε2 + #(Cr) · (ε)− ε′ . (3)
Since the literals that are not negations of variables in Ur are also not negations of variables in Cr
we have #(Ur) ≤ #(Cr). By a similar argument we also have #(Ur) ≤ #(Cr). Since |Ur| ≤ 2 we
also have #(Ur)+#(Ur) < #(Cr)+#(Cr), implying that either #(Ur) < #(Cr) or #(Ur) < #(Cr).
Therefore, we have that #(Cr) · ε2 +#(Cr) ·(ε) ≥ #(Ur) · ε2 +#(Ur) ·(ε)+ ε2 . Plugging this inequality
in (3), we have
|Ur| · ε+ e(nr) ≥ (#(Ur) + #(Ur)) · ε+ #(Ur) · ε2 + #(Ur) · (ε) + ε2 − ε′
> (#(Ur) + #(Ur)) · ε+ #(Ur) · ε2 + #(Ur) · (ε) (as ε′ < ε2)
= #(Ur) · 3ε2 + #(Ur) · (2ε) .
We will now characterize the optimal bundles (MPB chores) for each agents under the set prices.
Observation 14. For each literal `θ ∈ Sr, we have mrθ ∈ MPBnrθ .
Proof. We consider the cases, whether the `θ = xθ or `θ = ¬xθ.
• `θ = xθ: Note that the only other chore (other than mrθ) for which agent nrθ has disutility less
than τ is chore bθ2. Since `θ ∈ Sr, this means that xθ = T and therefore we have p(bθ2) = 1.
Now observe that,
d(nrθ,m
r
θ)
p(mrθ)
=
ε
ε
= 1
=
d(nrθ, b
θ
2)
p(bθ2)
.
Therefore mrθ ∈ MPBnrθ .
• `θ = ¬xθ: Note that the only other chore (other than mrθ) for which agent nrθ has disutility
less than τ is chore bθ1. Since `θ ∈ Sr, this means that xθ = F and therefore we have p(bθ1) = 12 .
Now observe that,
d(nrθ,m
r
θ)
p(mrθ)
=
4ε
3ε
=
4
3
=
2
3 · 12
=
d(nrθ, b
θ
1)
p(bθ1)
.
Therefore, mrθ ∈ MPBnrθ .
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This implies that for all literals `θ in Sr, the agent n
r
θ will earn her entire money of ε by doing
the chore `θ entirely. Therefore, now we only need to look at the agents n
r
θ and chores m
r
θ where
`θ ∈ Ur. To this end we observe that,
Observation 15. For each literal `θ ∈ Ur, we have mrθ ∈ MPBnrθ and mrθ ∈ MPBnr .
Proof. We first show that mrθ ∈ MPBnrθ . We make a distinction based on whether `θ = xθ or
`θ = ¬xθ.
• `θ = xθ: In this case we have p(mrθ) = αr · (3ε2 ). Note that the only other chore (other than
mrθ) for which agent n
r
θ has disutility less than τ is chore b
θ
2. Since `θ ∈ Ur, this means that
xθ = F and therefore we have p(b
θ
2) =
3
2 . Now observe that,
d(nrθ,m
r
θ)
p(mrθ)
=
1
αr
· ε3ε
2
=
1
αr
· 2
3
(4)
=
1
αr
· d(n
r
θ, b
θ
2)
p(bθ2)
<
d(nrθ, b
θ
2)
p(bθ2)
. (as αr > 1 by Observation 13)
• `θ = ¬xθ: In this case we have p(mrθ) = αr · (2ε). Note that the only other chore (other than
mrθ) for which agent n
r
θ has disutility less than τ is chore b
θ
1. Since `θ ∈ Ur, this means that
xθ = T and therefore we have p(b
θ
1) = 1. Now observe that,
d(nrθ,m
r
θ)
p(mrθ)
=
1
αr
· 4ε
3 · 2ε
=
1
αr
· 2
3
(5)
=
1
αr
· d(n
r
θ, b
θ
1)
p(bθ1)
<
d(nrθ, b
θ
1)
p(bθ1)
. (as αr > 1 by Observation 13)
Thus in both cases we have mrθ ∈ MPBnrθ .
We will now show that mrθ ∈ MPBnr as well. We do this by showing that the disutility to price
ratio of the chores mrθ, when `θ ∈ Ur, is minimum for the agent nr. To this end, first crucially
observe that from (4) and (5), irrespective of whether `θ = xθ or `θ = ¬xθ, we have d(n
r
θ,m
r
θ)
p(mrθ)
= 1αr · 23 .
Also, note that the disutility profile agent nr has for chore mrθ and the chores in the variable gadget
of xθ (b
θ
1 and b
θ
2) is identical to the disutility profile of agent n
r
θ for the same set of chores. Therefore,
for all `θ ∈ Ur we have d(n
r,mrθ)
p(mrθ)
= 1αr · 23 (irrespective of whether `θ = xθ or `θ = ¬xθ) which is
also strictly less than both
d(nr,bθ2)
p(bθ2)
and
d(nr,bθ1)
p(bθ1)
. We now look at disutility to price ratio that agent
nr has for chores in Sr. Observe that for all `β ∈ Sr we have p(mrβ) = ε and d(nr,mrβ) ≥ ε (as
the disutility is ε if `β = xβ and is
4ε
3 if `β = ¬xβ ). This implies that for all `β ∈ Sr we have
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d(nr,mrβ)
p(mrβ)
≥ 1 > 23 > 1αr · 23 (as αr > 1 by Observation 13). Therefore, the disutility to price ratio of
the chores mrθ, when `θ ∈ Ur, for agent nr is 1αr · 23 which is at most the disutility to price ratio of all
the chores for which nr has a disutility of less than τ . Therefore, we have
⋃
`θ∈Ur m
r
θ ⊆ MPBnr .
Now that we have identified the MPB chores for all the agents in the clause gadgets, we are
ready to show the money flow allocation. We set
f(nrθ,m
r
θ) = ε (for all `θ ∈ Sr)
f(nr,mrθ) = p(m
r
θ)− ε . (for all `θ ∈ Ur)
All agents spend on their corresponding MPB chores. Observe that for all `θ ∈ Sr, the agents nrθ
earn their money of ε by doing chore mrθ completely. Now, for all `θ ∈ Ur, the agents nrθ earn
their money of ε by doing chore mrθ partially. The agent n
r earns her entire money by completing
whatever is left of the chores in
⋃
`θ∈Ur m
r
θ. It only suffices to show that agent n
r earns exactly
e(nr). To this end, we observe that the total money earned by nr is
∑
`θ∈Ur
f(nr,mrθ) =
∑
`θ∈Ur
(p(mrθ)− ε)
= αr · (#(Ur) · 3ε2 + #(Ur) · (2ε))− |Ur| · ε
= e(nr) . (by (2))
Therefore, we have an allocation where the agents in the corresponding variable gadgets earn
their money by completing the chores in the variable gadgets and the agents in the clause gadget
earn their entire money by completing the chores in the clause gadgets. This concludes the proof
for the case Ur 6= ∅.
Case Ur = ∅: In this case we have that all the literals in the clause Cr belongs to the set Sr.
Therefore, for all the literals `θ occurring in Cr, we have,
p(mrθ) =
{
ε if `θ = ¬xθ,
ε+ e(n
r)
#(Sr)
if `θ = xθ
Like earlier, we will identify the MPB chores for all the clause gadget agents and then will outline
a money flow allocation where every agent earns all her money and all the chores are completed.
We first look into the agents nrθ. Very similar to Observation 14, we can claim that m
r
θ ∈ MPBnrθ
with a very similar argument as the one used in the proof of Observation 14: The agent nrθ has
disutility less than τ only for chores mrθ, b
θ
2 if `θ = xθ, and only for chores m
r
θ and b
θ
1 if `θ = ¬xθ,
and the price of the chore p(mrθ) is at least ε (it is more if `θ = xθ), while the prices of chores b
1
θ
and b2θ are the same as in Observation 14.
Now we look into the agent nr. Since the disutility profile of agent nr is identical to that of
nrθ when restricted to chores b
θ
1, b
θ
2 and m
r
θ, we can conclude that the disutility to price ratio of
mrθ for n
r is at most that of chores bθ1 and b
θ
2. Now observe that the disutility to price ratio of all
chores mrθ for n
r where `θ = xθ is
d(nr,mrθ)
p(mrθ)
= εp(mrθ)
≤ 1 (as p(mrθ) = ε+ e(n
r)
#(Sr)
), while the disutility
to price ratio all chores mrθ for n
r where `θ = ¬xθ is d(n
r,mrθ)
p(mrθ)
= 4ε3p(mrθ)
> 1 (as p(mrθ) = ε). Since
nr has a disutility of less than τ only for the chores in the clause gadget of Cr and the chores in
the corresponding variable gadgets, we can claim that
⋃
{θ|`θ=xθ}m
r
θ ⊆ MPBnr . Now, that we have
identified the MPB chores for the agents in the clause gadget, we outline a money flow,
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f(nrθ,m
r
θ) = ε (for all `θ)
f(nr,mrθ) = p(m
r
θ)− ε . (for all `θ = xθ)
All the agents spend on their corresponding MPB chores. Observe that for all `θ, the agents n
r
θ
earn their entire money of ε by doing chore mrθ (partially if `θ = xθ and completely when `θ = ¬xθ).
The agent nr earns her entire money by completing whatever is left of the chores in
⋃
{θ|`θ=xθ}m
r
θ.
It only suffices to show that agent nr earns exactly e(nr). To this end, we observe that the total
money earned by nr is ∑
{θ|`θ=xθ}
f(nr,mrθ) =
∑
{θ|`θ=xθ}
(p(mrθ)− ε)
= #(Sr) ·
(
ε+
e(nr)
#(Sr)
− ε
)
= e(nr).
Therefore, we have an allocation where the agents in the variable gadgets earn their money by
completing the chores in the variable gadgets and the agents in the clause gadgets earn their entire
money by completing the chores in the clause gadgets. This concludes the proof for the case
Ur = ∅.
This brings us to the main result of this section.
Theorem 16. Determining an (1112 + δ)-competitive equilibrium, for any δ > 0, in chore division
with fixed earnings is strongly NP-hard.
Proof. Given any instance I = 〈X,C〉 of 3-SAT, in polynomial time we can construct an instance
E(I) of chore division comprising of all variable gadgets and clause gadgets. Also, observe all
the entries in the disutility matrix d(·, ·) and the money vector e(·) are constants (Thus all input
parameters can be expressed with polynomial bit size in unary notation). Lemma 10 implies that
we have a (1112 + δ)-competitive equilibrium only if I is satisfiable and Lemma 11 implies that if
I is satisfiable, then E(I) admits a competitive equilibrium (and thus also a (1112 + δ)-competitive
equilibrium).
Remark 17. Note that every instance of chore division with fixed earnings 〈A,B, d(·, ·), e(·)〉, where
e(a) is an integer for all a ∈ A, can be transformed into an instance I ′ = 〈A′, B, d′(·, ·)〉 of chore
division with equal incomes (where e(a) = 1 for all a ∈ A′) by creating e(a) many identical copies
(having the exact same disutility profile) of the agent a ∈ A (the good set remains unchanged):
Every α-competitive equilibrium in I ′ will also be an α-competitive equilibrium in I. Observe that
in our instance E(I), we can scale the earning functions of all the agents by some large scalar
γ(ε, ε′) to make the earnings of the agents integral. Again, since e(a) ∈ O(1) and 1ε , 1ε′ ∈ O(1), we
have |A′| = O(|A|) and all the input parameters of A′ (all entries in the disutility matrix d′(·, ·)) can
be expressed with polynomial bit size in unary notation. Therefore, finding an (1112 + δ)-competitive
equilibrium, for any δ > 0, in chore division with equal incomes is also strongly NP-hard.
3 Sufficiency Conditions for the Existence of Equilibrium
In this section, we formulate certain conditions that if any instance of chore division satisfies, will
admit a competitive equilibrium. The reader is encouraged to read Section 1.2.2 to get an overall
picture of the results, ideas and techniques used in this section.
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Recall that in all the instances that we construct to show non-existence of competitive equilib-
rium, we crucially use the following structure in the disutility matrix: there are agent sets A1 and
A2 and sets of chores B1 and B2 such that agents in A1 have disutility of less than τ for all chores
in B1, but disutility of more than τ for all chores in B2; However, agents in A2 have disutility of
less than τ for some chores in B1 and all chores in B2. Therefore, we now look into instances which
do not have such structure in the disutility matrix. To this end, we define the disutility graph of
an instance as the bipartite graph D = (A ∪B,ED) containing the agents A as one vertex set and
the chores B as the other and there exists an edge from agent a ∈ A to chore b ∈ B if and only if
d(a, b) < τ . Our first sufficiency condition is that,
Condition 1: D is a disjoint union of complete bipartite graphs D1, D2, . . . , Dd for some d ≥ 1.
Observe that the above condition is violated by all the examples in Section 1.2.1 and the instance
E(I) in Section 2. Recall that we showed in Section 1.2.2 that Condition 1 alone is not sufficient
for chore division (it is sufficient for chore division with fixed earnings (Problem 2)). To this end,
we define the exchange graph of an instance as a graph W = ([d], EW ). We have (i, j) ∈ EW if and
only if for every chore b in the component Dj of the disutility matrix, there is an agent a ∈ Di such
that wa,b > 0. We now propose our second sufficiency condition.
Condition 2: W is strongly connected.
Let I denote all the instances of chore division that satisfy Condition 1 and Condition 2. We now
show that all instances in I admit a competitive equilibrium. Consider any instance I = 〈D,W 〉 ∈ I
such that D = ∪i∈[d]Di where each Di = (Ai ∪Bi, EDi) is a complete bipartite graph, disjoint from
Di′ (i
′ 6= i). For ease of notation:
• We represent our set A of n agents as [n] and the set B of m chores as [m].
• We also write pj to denote the price of chore j and wi,j to represent the agent i’s initial
endowment of chore j.
• Lastly, we also assume without loss of generality that the total endowment of each chore is
one:
∑
i∈[n]wi,j = 1.
Now, we briefly introduce some basic definitions and concepts required to prove the existence of
competitive equilibrium.
Normalized Prices and Bounded Allocations. A price vector p = 〈p1, p2, . . . , pm〉 is called
a normalized price vector if
• pj ≥ 0 for all j ∈ [m],
• ∑j∈[m] pj = 1, and
• ∑i∈Ak∑j∈[m]wi,j · pj = ∑j∈Bk pj for each component Dk in the disutility graph (sum of
prices of chores in Dk equals the sum of total money of the agents in Dk).
Let P be the set of all normalized price vectors. We first show that the set P is non-empty.
Observation 18. We have P 6= ∅.
Proof. Here we will make use of a general fact that will be useful for a proof later as well.
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Fact 19. Let Z ∈ Rn×n be a square matrix such that Zij ≥ 0 for all j 6= i (all the non-diagonal
entries of Z are non-negative) and
∑
i∈[n] Zij = 0 for all j ∈ [n] (column sums are zero), then there
exists a vector t ∈ Rn≥0 such that
∑
i∈[n] ti = 1 and Z · t = 0.
The proof of this fact can be found at the end of this section. Using this fact, we will outline a
proof that P is non-empty. For each component Dk of the disutility matrix we pick a chore bk ∈ Bk
and we set pj = 0 for all j ∈ Bk \ {bk}. Note that to show that P is non-empty, it suffices to show
that there exists a vector p′ = 〈p′1, p′2, . . . , p′d〉 (intuitively each p′k corresponds to the price of chore
bk ∈ Bk, i.e., pbk) such that p′k ≥ 0 for all k ∈ [d],
∑
k∈[d] p
′
k = 1 and we have,
∑
i∈Ak
∑
k′∈[d]
wi,bk′ · p′k′ − p′k = 0 for all k ∈ [d] (6)
Let W be the coefficient matrix of the system of equations in (6), i.e., W · p′ = 0 represents the
system of equations in (6). Observe that Wkk′ =
∑
i∈Ak wi,bk′ if k 6= k′ and Wkk =
∑
i∈Ak wi,bk − 1.
Therefore the non-diagonal entries of W are non-negative and also note that the column sum is
zero: ∑
k∈[d]
Mkk′ =
∑
k∈[d]
∑
i∈Ak
wi,bk′ − 1
=
∑
i∈[n]
wi,bk′ − 1
= 1− 1 (total endowment is one)
= 0.
Therefore W satisfies all the conditions in Fact 19. Therefore, by Fact 19 there exists a p′ ∈ Rd≥0,
such that
∑
k∈[d] p
′
d = 1 and W · p′ = 0. Therefore, P is non-empty.
Since P is defined by a set of linear equalities and inequalities, P is closed and convex too.
Additionally, since p ∈ Rm≥0 and
∑
j∈[m] pj = 1 for all p ∈ P , P is compact. We now make a small
observation about any p ∈ P that will be useful later.
Observation 20. Consider any p ∈ P . For all k ∈ [d], we have that the total price of chores in a
component is strictly larger than zero:
∑
j∈Bk pj > 0.
Proof. We prove this by contradiction. Assume otherwise and let ` ∈ [d] be such that∑j∈B` pj = 0.
Since p ∈ P , we have ∑i∈A`∑j∈[m]wi,j ·pj = 0 as well. Consider any `′ ∈ [d] such that (`, `′) ∈ EW
(recall that EW is the edge set of the exchange graph W ). By Condition 2, we have that for
each chore b ∈ B`′ , there is an agent a ∈ A` such that wa,b > 0. Therefore, the only way∑
i∈A`
∑
j∈[m]wi,j · pj = 0 is if all the prices of the chores in B`′ is 0. This implies that if the sum
of prices of the chores in any component D` is zero, then the sum of prices of the chores in all
the components D`′ such that (`, `
′) ∈ EW is also zero. Since the exchange graph W is strongly
connected, a repeated application of this argument will imply that sum of prices of all chores is
zero for every component, which is a contradiction as we have
∑
j∈[m] pj = 1.
An allocation X ∈ Rn×m≥0 , is called a bounded allocation if each Xij (quantifies the amount of
chore j allocated to agent i) is non-negative and is at most m · dmaxdmin , where dmax and dmin refer to
the largest and smallest entry less than τ in the disutility matrix. Let X be the set of all bounded
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allocations. Observe that the set X is non-empty, convex and compact. Also, we have that P is
non-empty, convex and compact. We define a compact, convex and non-empty subset of R(m+nm),
S =
⋃
p∈P
⋃
X∈X〈p,X〉 9.
Correspondence φ. Our goal is to define a correspondence or equivalently a set valued function
φ : S → 2S , such that φ has at least one fixed point and any fixed point of φ will correspond
to competitive equilibrium. We will first show some properties that if satisfied by φ, then φ will
have at least one fixed point and any fixed point of φ will correspond to a competitive equilibrium.
Then, we will define a φ that satisfies these properties.
Properties. We first make some basic definitions that will help us to state the properties. We
call a bounded allocation Y ∈ X an optimal allocation at the price vector p if and only if,
• Yij > 0 only if d(i, j) < τ , d(i,j)pj ≤
d(i,`)
p`
for all ` ∈ [m], and
• ∑j∈[m] Yij · pj = ∑j∈[m]wi,j · pj for all i ∈ [n].
Let Xp ⊆ X denote the set of all optimal allocations at the price vector p. Right now, it may not be
immediately clear that Xp is non-empty. However, we show that this is indeed the case, as agents
are allowed to consume goods to a significant extent (Yij is allowed to be as large as m · dmaxdmin ).
Lemma 21. For all p ∈ P , we have Xp ⊆ X and Xp 6= ∅.
Proof. By definition Xp ⊆ X. Therefore, it suffices to show that it is non-empty. Consider any
p ∈ P . Consider any agent a ∈ Ak (recall that Ak is the set of agents that belong to the component
Dk of the disutility graph). Let w(a) =
∑
j∈[m]wa,j · pj . If w(a) = 0, then we set Yaj = 0 for all
j ∈ [m] and we trivially have ∑j∈[m] Yaj · pj = ∑j∈[m]wa,j · pj = 0 and 〈Ya1, . . . , Yam〉 is an optimal
bundle for agent a at p. So assume that w(a) > 0. Since p ∈ P , we have that the sum of prices of
the chores in Dk,
∑
j∈Bk pj =
∑
i∈Ak
∑
j∈[m]wi,j · pj ≥
∑
j∈[m]waj · pj = w(a). This implies that
there is at least one chore b ∈ Bk such that pb ≥ w(a)m . Let b′ be a chore such that d(a, b′) < τ ,
d(a,b′)
pb′
≤ d(a,`)p` for all ` ∈ [m]. This implies that
d(a,b′)
pb′
≤ d(a,b)pb . Therefore, we have that
pb′ ≥ d(a, b
′)
d(a, b)
· pb
≥ dmin
dmax
· pb
≥ dmin
mdmax
·w(a).
We set Yab′ =
w(a)
pb′
. Observe that Yab′ ≤ m · dmaxdmin . Therefore, Y is a bounded allocation. Also,
note that each agent a earns her entire money of w(a) by doing w(a)pb′
amount of chore b′ such
that d(a, b′) < τ , d(a,b
′)
pb′
≤ d(a,`)p` for all ` ∈ [m]. Thus, Y is an optimal bundle also. Therefore,
Xp 6= ∅.
We are now ready to define the properties of φ. For any point 〈p,X〉 ∈ S, consider any point
〈p′, X ′〉 ∈ φ(〈p,X〉). Then,
9We abuse notation slightly here: 〈p,X〉 refers to the (m + nm)-dimensional vector
〈p1, p2, . . . , pm, X11, X12, . . . , Xnm〉.
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• Property P1: X ′ ∈ Xp and p′ ∈ P .
• Property P2: For any two agents i and j that belong to the same component of the disutility
graph D (say i, j ∈ Ak), and pj 6= 0, we have
p′i
p′j
=
pi + max (1−
∑
`∈[n]X`i, 0)
pj + max (1−
∑
`∈[n]X`j , 0)
.
.
• Property P3: φ(〈p,X〉) is non-empty and convex.
• Property P4: φ has a closed graph10.
We will now show that any correspondence φ that satisfies P1, P2, P3 and P4 will have at least
one fixed point and any fixed point will correspond to competitive equilibrium. We first show that
φ has a fixed point.
Lemma 22. Consider any correspondence φ that satisfies properties P1, P2, P3 and P4. φ has a
fixed point.
Proof. By property P1 we have that if 〈p′, X ′〉 ∈ φ(〈p,X〉), then 〈p′, X ′〉 ∈ S (as p′ ∈ P and
X ′ ∈ Xp ⊆ X). Therefore, φ : S → 2S . The set S is non-empty, compact and convex. Furthermore,
by properties P3 and P4, we have that φ(〈p,X〉) is non-empty and convex, and φ has a closed graph.
Therefore, by Kakutani’s fixed point theorem, φ has a fixed point.
Now we show that any fixed point of a correspondence φ that satisfies properties P1, P2, P3
and P4 gives a competitive equilibrium.
Lemma 23. Consider any correspondence φ that satisfies properties P1, P2, P3 and P4. Consider
any fixed point 〈p,X〉 of φ. Then 〈p,X〉 is a competitive equilibrium.
Proof. Consider any fixed point 〈p,X〉 ∈ φ(〈p,X〉). By property P1 it follows that X ∈ Xp. Now,
it suffices to show that we have pj > 0 for all j ∈ [m] and
∑
i∈[n]Xij = 1 for all chores j ∈ [m].
We first show that pj > 0 for all j ∈ [m]. We prove this by contradiction. Let us assume that
there is some chore b in some component D` of the disutility graph such that pb = 0. Note that
by Observation 20, there is at least one chore b′ ∈ B` such that pb′ > 0. This implies that for all
agents i ∈ A`, we have d(i,b
′)
pb′
< d(i,b)pb . Therefore, we have that Xib = 0 for all i ∈ A` and also for
all i ∈ [n] (as Xi` > 0 only if d(i, `) < τ and for all agents in [n] \Ak we have d(i, b) ≥ τ), implying∑
`∈[n]X`b = 0. Now observe that,
p′b
p′b′
=
pb + max (1−
∑
`∈[n]X`b, 0)
pb′ + max (1−
∑
`∈[n]X`b′ , 0)
(by property P2)
=
0 + 1
pb′ + max (1−
∑
`∈[n]X`b′ , 0)
6= 0
=
pb
pb′
.
10A correspondence φ : X → 2Y has a closed graph if for all sequences {xn}n∈N and {yn}n∈N, with xn ∈ X and
yn ∈ φ(xn) for all n, such that xn → x and yn → y, we have y ∈ φ(x).
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This implies that p′ 6= p, which is a contradiction to 〈p,X〉 being a fixed point.
Therefore, we have pj > 0 for all j ∈ [m]. We now show that
∑
i∈[n]Xij = 1 for all j ∈ [m].
We prove this also by contradiction. So assume otherwise and for some chore b ∈ Bk we have∑
i∈[n]Xib > 1 (or
∑
i∈[n]Xib < 1). Note that, since p ∈ P , for the component Dk of the disutility
graph, we have, ∑
j∈Bk
pj =
∑
i∈Ak
∑
j∈[m]
wi,j · pj . (7)
Also, sinceX ∈ Xp, for every agent i ∈ Ak, we have
∑
j∈[m]wi,j ·pj =
∑
j∈[m]Xij ·pj =
∑
j∈Bk Xij ·pj .
Substituting
∑
j∈[m]wi,j · pj as
∑
j∈Bk Xij · pj in (7) we have,∑
j∈Bk
pj =
∑
i∈Ak
∑
j∈Bk
Xij · pj
=
∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈Bk
Xij · pj
=
∑
j∈Bk
pj · (
∑
i∈[n]
Xij) .
Therefore, if
∑
i∈[n]Xib > 1 (or
∑
i∈[n]Xib < 1) for some b ∈ Bk, then there exists a b′ ∈ Bk such
that
∑
i∈[n]Xib′ < 1 (or
∑
i∈[n]Xib′ > 1). This would imply that
pb+max(1−
∑
`∈[n]X`b,0)
pb′+max(1−
∑
`∈[n]X`b′ ,0)
< pbpb′
when∑
i∈[n]Xib > 1 and
pb+max(1−
∑
`∈[n]X`b,0)
pb′+max(1−
∑
`∈[n]X`b′ ,0)
> pbpb′
when
∑
i∈[n]Xib < 1, which is a contradiction (as
pb+max(1−
∑
`∈[n]X`b,0)
pb′+max(1−
∑
`∈[n]X`b′ ,0)
= pbpb′
if 〈p,X〉 is a fixed point by property P2).
Now, it suffices to show that there exists a correspondence φ that satisfies all the four properties
to show the existence of competitive equilibrium for every instance I ∈ I. To this end, we first
define a correspondence φ and show that it satisfies all the four properties.
Finding a Correspondence φ that Satisfies all the Properties. Given a p ∈ P and X ∈ X,
we define the vector q = 〈q1, q2, . . . , qm〉 such that
qj = pj + max (1−
∑
i∈[n]
Xij , 0) . (8)
We will now outline a system of linear equations that needs to be satisfied by a vector p˜ =
〈p˜1, p˜2, . . . , p˜d〉 (recall that d is the number of components in the disutility graph D). So think of
each p˜i as a variable now. As of now, let us think of each p˜k as the sum of prices of the chores in
the component Dk and
qj
Qk
· p˜k as the price of each chore j ∈ Bk, where Qk =
∑
j∈Bk qj . We make
a small observation about Qk, which will be useful later.
Claim 24. For all k ∈ [d], we have Qk > 0.
Proof. Each qj is at least as large as pj , implying Qk =
∑
j∈Bk qj ≥
∑
j∈Bk pj and by Observation 20
we have
∑
j∈Bk pj > 0.
With these prices (p˜1, p˜2, . . . , p˜d) in mind, for each component Dk of D, we write the equation
(variables being
⋃
k∈[d] p˜k) that represents the total money the agents earn in the component equals
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the total prices of the chores in the same component.∑
i∈Ak
∑
k′∈[d]
∑
j∈Bk′
wi,j · qj
Qk′
· p˜k′ − p˜k = 0 . (9)
We represent the system of equations in (9) as
M · p˜ = 0 . (10)
First observe that every entry of the matrix M is bounded: This is primarily due to the fact
that Qk > 0 for all k ∈ [d].
Observation 25. We have Mkk′ ≥ 0 as long as k 6= k′ (every non-diagonal entry of M is non-zero)
and
∑
k∈[d]Mkk′ = 0 for all k
′ ∈ [d] (column sums are zero).
Proof. We first carefully look at any column M∗k′ of M . Note that for all k 6= k′, we have,
Mkk′ =
∑
i∈Ak
∑
j∈Bk′ wi,j ·
qj
Qk′
. We have Mkk =
∑
i∈Ak
∑
j∈Bk wi,j ·
qj
Qk
− 1. Therefore, every
non-diagonal entry in M is non-negative. Now we just need to show that 1T ·M∗k′ = 0. Observe,
1T ·M∗k′ =
∑
k∈[d]
∑
i∈Ak
∑
j∈Bk′
wi,j · qjQk′ − 1
= 1Qk′
·
∑
j∈Bk′
qj ·
∑
k∈[d]
∑
i∈Ak
wi,j − 1
= 1Qk′
·
∑
j∈Bk′
qj ·
∑
i∈[n]
wi,j − 1
= 1Qk′
·
∑
j∈Bk′
qj − 1
= 0.
This shows that 1T ·M = 0T .
We first make some observations about the solution to the system of equations in (10) (and
consequently (9)). Observe that M satisfies all the conditions in Fact 19. Therefore, we have
Observation 26. There exists a solution to the system of equations in (10) such that p˜j ≥ 0 for
all j ∈ [d] and ∑j∈[d] p˜j = 1.
We are now ready to define the correspondence. Given any 〈p,X〉 ∈ S, we determine the vector
q as in (8). Observe that q is a function of p and X. Hence, from now on, for clarity we would write
the vector q, the scalars Qk for all k ∈ [d] as q(p,X) and Qk(p,X) respectively. Let P˜ (p,X) ⊆ 2R
d
≥0
be the set of all vectors that satisfy the conditions in Observation 26. For each p˜ ∈ P˜ (p,X), we
define the vector p(p˜) = 〈p1(p˜), . . . , pm(p˜)〉 as follows: For every chore j that lies in the component
Dk of the disutility graph D, we define
pj(p˜) =
qj(p,X)
Qk(p,X)
· p˜k .
Let P (p,X) =
{
p(p˜) | p˜ ∈ P˜ (p,X)
}
. Given any 〈p,X〉 ∈ S, we define,
φ(〈p,X〉) = {〈p,X ′〉 | p ∈ P (p,X) and X ′ ∈ Xp} .
For the rest of this section, we will now show that φ satisfies properties P1, P2, P3 and P4.
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φ satisfies properties P1, P2, P3 and P4.
Lemma 27. φ satisfies property P1.
Proof. We need to show that p′ ∈ P and X ′ ∈ Xp ⊆ X. Note that by the definition of φ we have
X ′ ∈ Xp ⊆ X. Therefore, we only need to show that p′ ∈ P . Given p and X let q(p,X) be the
vector obtained as in (8) and let Qk(p,X) =
∑
j∈Bk qj(p,X) be the scalars for all k ∈ [d]. Then
p′ = p(p˜) for some p˜ ∈ P˜ (p,X). Now we make three claims which show that p′ ∈ P .
Claim 28. We have p′j ≥ 0 for all j ∈ [m].
Proof. Let us consider any chore j that belongs to the component Dk in the disutility matrix.
p′j = pj(p˜)
=
qj(p,X)
Qk(p,X)
· p˜k .
Observe from the definition of q(p,X) in (8) that q` ≥ 0 for all ` ∈ [m]. Also, from the definition
of the vector p˜, we have p˜` ≥ 0 for all ` ∈ [d]. This implies that p′j ≥ 0.
Claim 29. We have
∑
j∈[m] p
′
j = 1.
Proof. We have
∑
j∈[m] p
′
j =
∑
j∈[m] pj(p˜) =
∑
k∈[d]
∑
j∈Bk
qj(p,X)
Qk(p,X)
· p˜k =
∑
k∈[d] p˜k = 1.
Claim 30. For each component Dk of the disutility graph, we have
∑
i∈Ak
∑
j∈[m]wi,j · p′j =∑
j∈Bk p
′
j.
Proof. We have, ∑
i∈Ak
∑
j∈[m]
wi,j · p′j =
∑
i∈Ak
∑
j∈[m]
wi,j · pj(p˜)
=
∑
i∈Ak
∑
k′∈[d]
∑
j∈Bk′
wi,j · qj(p,X)
Qk′(p,X)
· p˜k′ .
Since p˜ satisfies (10) and therefore also (9), we have
∑
i∈Ak
∑
k′∈[d]
∑
j∈Bk′ wi,j ·
qj(p,X)
Qk′ (p,X)
· p˜k′ = p˜k.
Therefore, we have ∑
i∈Ak
∑
j∈[m]
wi,j · p′j = p˜k
=
∑
j∈Bk
qj(p,X)
Qk(p,X)
· p˜k
=
∑
j∈Bk
pj(p˜)
=
∑
j∈Bk
p′j .
This shows that p′ ∈ P and completes the proof.
Lemma 31. φ satisfies property P2.
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Proof. Consider any 〈p′, X ′〉 ∈ φ(〈p,X〉). Let i, j be two chores in the component Dk of the
disutility graph such that p′j 6= 0. Since p′j = qj(p,X)Qk(p,X) · p˜k 6= 0, we have p˜k 6= 0. Now observe that,
p′i
p′j
=
pi(p˜)
pj(p˜)
=
qi(p,X)
Qk(p,X)
· p˜k
qj(p,X)
Qk(p,X)
· p˜k
=
qi(p,X)
qj(p,X)
(as Qk(p,X) 6= 0 and p˜k 6= 0)
=
pi + max (1−
∑
`∈[n]X`i, 0)
pj + max (1−
∑
`∈[n]X`j , 0)
. (by definition of q(p,X) in (8))
Lemma 32. φ satisfies property P3.
Proof. We first show that Xp is convex. Consider Y ∈ Xp and Y ′ ∈ Xp. Let Y ′′ = λ ·Y +(1−λ) ·Y ′
for some λ ∈ [0, 1]. First observe that 0 ≤ min(Yij , Y ′ij) ≤ Y ′′ij ≤ max (Yij , Y ′ij) ≤ m· dmaxdmin . Therefore,
Y ′′ ∈ X. Also, notice that we have Yij > 0 only if d(i, j) < τ and d(i,j)pj ≤
d(i,`)
p`
for all ` ∈ [m].
Therefore, we also have Y ′ij > 0 only if d(i, j) < τ and
d(i,j)
pj
≤ d(i,`)p` for all ` ∈ [m]. Lastly we have,∑
j∈[m]
Y ′′ij · pj =
∑
j∈[m]
(λ · Yij + (1− λ) · Y ′ij) · pj
= λ · (
∑
j∈[m]
Yij · pj) + (1− λ) · (
∑
j∈[m]
Y ′ij · pj)
= λ ·
∑
j∈[m]
wi,j · pj + (1− λ) ·
∑
j∈[m]
wi,j · pj
=
∑
j∈[m]
wi,j · pj .
Thus, Y ′′ ∈ Xp. Therefore, Xp is convex and non-empty (by Lemma 21).
We now show that P (p,X) is convex and non-empty. By Observation 26, we have that P˜ (p,X)
is non-empty and therefore P is also non-empty. To show that it is convex, consider two price
vectors t and t′ in P˜ (p,X). To show convexity, we need to show that λ · p(t) + (1− λ) · p(t′) is in
P for all λ ∈ [0, 1]. Note that for all j ∈ [m], that belongs to the component Dk in the disutility
graph, we have
λ · pj(t) + (1− λ) · pj(t′) = qj(p,X)Qk(p,X) · (λ · tj + (1− λ) · t
′
j) .
Thus it suffices to show that λ · t + (1 − λ) · t′ ∈ P˜ (p,X). This is true as P˜ (p,X) is defined by a
set of linear equalities and inequalities, and therefore is convex.
Therefore, we have that both the sets P (p,X) and Xp are non-empty and convex. thus, φ(〈p,X〉)
is also non-empty and convex as it is the Cartesian product of P (p,X) and Xp.
Lemma 33. φ satisfies property P4.
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Proof. Consider a sequence 〈pn, Xn〉 that converges to 〈p∗, X∗〉 and 〈pn, Xn〉 ∈ S for all n. Similarly,
consider the sequence 〈rn, Y n〉 that converges to 〈r∗, Y ∗〉 such that 〈rn, Y n〉 ∈ φ(〈pn, Xn〉) for all
n. To show that φ has a closed graph, we need to show that 〈r∗, Y ∗〉 ∈ φ(〈p∗, X∗〉). To show that,
〈r∗, Y ∗〉 ∈ φ(〈p∗, X∗〉), we need to show,
1. r∗ ∈ P (p∗, X∗), and
2. Y ∗ ∈ Xp∗ .
Proving r∗ ∈ P (p∗, X∗): We first outline the necessary and sufficient condition for any vector p′
to be in P (p,X), as this will be useful for our proof.
Observation 34. p′ ∈ P (p,X) if and only if
1. p′ ∈ P , and
2. for each chore j in component Dk, we have p
′
j =
qj(p,X)
Qk(p,X)
·∑j∈Bk p′j.
Proof. We first show the “if” direction. For each component Dk of the disutility graph, let p˜k =∑
j∈Bk p
′
j . Then for each chore j ∈ Bk, we have p′j = qj(p,X)Qk(p,X) · p˜k. Let p˜ = 〈p˜1, . . . , p˜d〉. To show that
p′ ∈ P (p,X), it suffices to show that p˜ ∈ P˜ (p,X). To this end, observe that p˜k =
∑
j∈Bk p
′
j ≥ 0 as
p′j ≥ 0 for all j ∈ [m] (as p′ ∈ P ). Furthermore,
∑
k∈[d] p˜k =
∑
j∈[m] p
′
j = 1 (as p
′ ∈ P ). Now, to
show p˜ ∈ P˜ (p,X) it suffices to show that p˜ satisfies the system of equations in (10) or equivalently
those in (9). To this end, since p′ ∈ P , for each component Dk we have,∑
i∈Ak
∑
j∈[m]
wi,j · p′j =
∑
j∈Bk
p′j .
Or equivalently, ∑
i∈Ak
∑
k′∈[d]
∑
j∈Bk′
wi,j · p′j =
∑
j∈Bk
p′j .
Substituting every p′j as
qj(p,X)
Qk(p,X)
· p˜k where chore j is in the component Dk we have,∑
i∈Ak
∑
k′∈[d]
∑
j∈Bk′
wi,j · qj(p,X)
Qk(p,X)
p˜k′ = p˜k .
Therefore, p˜k satisfies (9). Thus p˜ ∈ P˜ (p,X).
Now we show the “only if” direction. So assume p′ ∈ P (p,X). Then, by Claims 28, 29 and
30 we have that p′ ∈ P . Also by the definition of P (p,X), we also have that there exists a vector
p˜ = 〈p˜1, . . . , p˜d〉 such that for all j ∈ [m] we have p′j = qj(p,X)Qk(p,X) · p˜k where Dk is the component
in the disutility graph containing chore j. So it just suffices to show that p˜k =
∑
j∈Bk p
′
j for all
k ∈ [d]. Now observe that, ∑
j∈Bk
p′j =
∑
j∈Bk
qj(p,X)
Qk(p,X)
· p˜k
=
∑
j∈Bk qj(p,X)
Qk(p,X)
· p˜k
= p˜k.
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Now we make an observation about the continuity of the functions q(p,X) and Qk(p,X) =∑
j∈Bk qj(p,X) for all k ∈ [d]. Given p and X, let q(p,X) be the vector obtained as in (8). Observe
that q(p,X) is a continuous function in p and X for all p ∈ P and X ∈ X. As a result, even
Qk(p,X) is a continuous function in p and X for all k ∈ [d]. We are now ready to show that
r∗ ∈ P (p∗, X∗).
The r∗ is the limit of the sequence rn. Since for all n, 〈rn, Y n〉 ∈ φ(〈pn, Xn〉), we can conclude
that each rn ∈ P . Since the set P is compact (and therefore closed), we have that r∗ ∈ P as
well. Now, by Observation 34 it suffices to show that for each chore j in component Dk, we
have r∗j =
qj(p
∗,X∗)
Qk(p∗,X∗)
·∑j′∈Bk r∗j′ . Again, since every rn ∈ P (pn, Xn), we have for each chore j in
component Dk, r
n
j =
qj(p
n,Xn)
Qk(pn,Xn)
·∑j′∈Bk rnj′ . Let fj(r, p,X) = rj − qj(p,X)Qk(p,X) ·∑j′∈Bk rj′ . Observe
that for all j ∈ [m] the limit of the sequence hnj = fj(rn, pn, Xn), h∗j is zero (as hnj is zero for all n).
Again, since q(p,X) and Qk(p,X) (for all k ∈ [d]) are continuous functions in p ∈ P and X ∈ X, and
Qk(p,X) > 0 (for all k ∈ [d]) by Claim 24 for all p ∈ P and X ∈ X, we can conclude that fj(r, p,X)
is well defined and also a continuous function in p, X and r for all j ∈ [m]. Thus the limit of the
sequence hnj = fj(r
n, pn, Xn) is h∗j = fj(r
∗, p∗, X∗) = r∗j − qj(p
∗,X∗)
Qk(p∗,X∗)
·∑j′∈Bk r∗j′ . Since we know that
h∗j = 0 for all j ∈ [m], we can conclude that for all j ∈ [m], we have r∗j − qj(p
∗,X∗)
Qk(p∗,X∗)
·∑j∈Bk r∗j = 0,
implying r∗j =
qj(p
∗,X∗)
Qk(p∗,X∗)
·∑j∈Bk r∗j .
Proving Y ∗ ∈ Xp∗: To show Y ∗ ∈ Xp∗ , we need to show, for every agent i,
1. Y ∗ij > 0 only if
d(i,j′)
p∗j
≤ d(i,j)p∗
j′
for all j′ ∈ [m], and
2.
∑
j∈[m]wi,j · p∗j =
∑
j∈[m] Y
∗
ij · p∗j .
We first show part 1 by contradiction, Assume that there exists i, j and j′ such that Y ∗ij > β > 0
and d(i,j)p∗j
> d(i,j
′)
p∗
j′
(1 + δ) for some δ > 0. Since p∗ ∈ P , by Observation 20 we have that there is
at least one chore in each component with a non-zero price, and therefore, we can assume without
loss of generality that p∗j′ > 0. Let ε > 0 be such that ε min(β,
d(i,j)·p∗
j′−(1+δ)·d(i,j′)·p∗j
(1+δ)·d(i,j′)+d(i,j) ). Such an
ε exists as
d(i,j)·p∗
j′−(1+δ)·d(i,j′)·p∗j
(1+δ)·d(i,j′)+d(i,j) > 0 for all values of p
∗
j : when p
∗
j = 0, then
d(i,j)·p∗
j′
(1+δ)·d(i,j′)+d(i,j) > 0 as
p∗j′ > 0 and when p
∗
j > 0, then d(i, j) · p∗j′ − (1 + δ) · d(i, j′) · p∗j > 0 as d(i,j)p∗j > (1 + δ) ·
d(i,j)
p∗
j′
. Since
Y n converges to Y ∗ and pn converges to p∗, we know that there exists an n0 ∈ N be such that for
n > n0 we have |Y ∗ij − Yij | < ε and |p∗j − pnj | < ε and |p∗j′ − pnj′ | < ε. It can be verified easily that
for our choice of ε we have Y nij > 0, and
d(i,j)
pnj
> d(i,j)pn
j′
, for all n > n0, which implies that Y
n /∈ Xpn ,
which is a contradiction.
We also prove part 2 by contradiction. Assume that
∑
j∈[m]wi,j ·p∗j−
∑
j∈[m] Y
∗
ij ·p∗j = δ for some
non-zero δ. Since Y n converges to Y ∗ and pn converges to p∗, we know that for every ε > 0, there
exists an n0 ∈ N be such that for n > n0 we have |Y ∗ij − Yij | < ε and |p∗j − pnj | < ε for all j ∈ [m].
Therefore, by choosing a sufficiently small ε we can ensure that
∑
j∈[m]wi,j ·pnj −
∑
j∈[m] Y
n
ij ·pnj 6= 0,
for all n > n0, which would imply that Y
n /∈ Xpn , which is a contradiction.
We are now ready to state the main result of this section
Theorem 35. Every instance I ∈ I admits a competitive efficient allocation.
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Proof. We defined a correspondence φ that satisfies properties P1, P2, P3 and P4 by Lem-
mas 27, 31, 32 and 33. By Lemma 22 we have that any correspondence that satisfies the properties
P1, P2, P3 and P4 has a fixed point. Finally, by Lemma 23, any fixed point of this correspondence
will correspond to competitive equilibrium in I. Therefore, our correspondence φ has at least one
fixed point and this fixed point corresponds to a competitive equilibrium.
Proof of Fact 19: Recall Fact 19.
Fact. Let Z ∈ Rn×n be a square matrix such that Zij ≥ 0 for all j 6= i (all the non-diagonal
entries of Z are non-negative) and
∑
i∈[n] Zij = 0 (column sums are zero), then there exists a
vector t ∈ Rn≥0 such that
∑
i∈[n] ti = 1 and Z · t = 0.
Proof. Let λ  max i,j∈[n](Zij). Let Z ′ = 1λZ. Observe that every t that satisfies Z ′ · t = 0, also
satisfies Z · t = 0 and vice versa. Also, each entry in the matrix Z ′ has absolute value is less than
one. Let Z ′′ = (Z ′ + I) where I is the identity matrix. Note that every entry in the matrix Z ′′ is
non-negative. Also every t that satisfies Z ′′ · t = t, also satisfies Z ′ · t = 0 and therefore also satisfies
Z · t = 0 and vice versa. From here on, we will be dealing with the following system of equations
Z ′′ · t = t . (11)
We first observe that the matrix Z ′′ is column stochastic: For all j ∈ [n], we have∑
i∈[n]
Z ′′ij =
∑
i∈[n]
(
1
λ
· Zij + Iij)
=
∑
i∈[n]
1
λ
· Zij + 1
= 0 + 1 (Column sums are zero in Z)
= 1 .
Now, let R =
{
r ∈ Rn≥0 |
∑
j∈[n] rj = 1
}
. Observe that the set R is non-empty, convex and compact.
We first make a small claim.
Claim 36. Let r′ = Z ′′ · r. If r ∈ R then r′ ∈ R.
Proof. Since every entry in the matrix Z ′′ and every component of the vector r is non-negative, we
also have that every component of r′ is also non-negative: r′j ≥ 0 for all j ∈ [d]. Now observe that∑
j∈[n]
r′j = 1
T · r′
= 1T · Z ′′ · r
= 1T · r (as Z ′′ is column stochastic)
=
∑
j∈[m]
rj
= 1.
Thus, r′ ∈ R.
We define f : R → R such that f(r) = Z ′′ · r. Observe that f is also continuous. Thus, by
Brouwer’s fixed point theorem there is a t ∈ R, such that f(t) = t or equivalently Z ′′ · t = t.
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4 Hardness of Finding Equilibrium under Sufficiency Conditions
In this section, we show that chore division may still be intractable even for the instances that satisfy
Conditions 1 and 2 mentioned in Section 3. We show that it is PPAD-hard to find a competitive
equilibrium on instances that satisfy Conditions 1 and 2 in Section 3. We will show that any
polynomial time algorithm that determines a competitive equilibrium on instances that satisfy
Conditions 1 and 2, will find an equilibrium in a normalized polymatrix game. The normalized
polymatrix game is known to be PPAD-hard [CPY17]. Recall the normalized polymatrix game:
Problem. (Normalized Polymatrix Game) [CPY17]
Given: A 2n × 2n rational matrix M with every entry in [0, 1] and Mi,2j−1 + Mi,2j = 1 for all
i ∈ [2n] and j ∈ [n] .
Find: Equilibrium strategy vector x ∈ R2n≥0 such that x2i−1 + x2i = 1 and
xT ·M∗,2i−1 > xT ·M∗,2i + 1n =⇒ x2i = 0.
xT ·M∗,2i > xT ·M∗,2i−1 + 1n =⇒ x2i−1 = 0.
where M∗,k represents the kth column of the matrix M.
From the next section onward, we elaborate our proof: We first introduce all agents and chores.
Thereafter, we define the disutility matrix and endowment matrix and show that our instance sat-
isfies the sufficiency conditions of Section 3, and therefore admits a competitive equilibrium. Then,
we show that our instance exhibits the four properties of pairwise equal endowments, fixed earning,
price equality, price regulation and reverse ratio amplification (as discussed in Section 1.2.3), and
thus in polynomial-time we can construct the equilibrium strategy vector x for I from any compet-
itive equilibrium in E(I). The reader is highly encouraged to read Section 1.2.3 before reading the
elaborate version of the proof to get the idea of the overall proof sketch.
4.1 Agent and Chore Sets
We define the set of K = 2c · dlog(n)e (c = 4) many sets of chores (observe crucially that K is
even),
Bk =
{
∪i∈[2n]bki
}
for all k ∈ [K],
and K many sets of agents
Ak =

{∪i∈[2n]a1i} ∪ {∪i∈[2n]a′i} when k = 1,{∪i∈[2n]aki } ∪ {∪i∈[n]aki } when 2 ≤ k ≤ K − 1,{
∪i,j∈[2n]aKi,j
}
∪ {∪i∈[n]aKi } when k = K.
We remark that the sets A1, AK of agents and sets B1, BK of chores are to enforce the fixed
earning, price equality and price regulation properties as mentioned in sketch of the reduction in
Section 1.2.3, while the sets Ak of agents and Bk of chores for all 2 ≤ k ≤ K − 1 are to enforce
reverse ratio amplification property as mentioned in Section 1.2.3. We now define the disutility
matrix and the endowment matrix of the instance.
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Disutility Matrix and the Disutility Graph. The disutility graph for our instance will be
a disjoint union of complete bipartite graphs and the entries in our disutility matrix will be to
enforce price-regulation and reverse ratio-amplification properties. We now describe the disutility
matrix: We define only the disutility values that are less than τ in the matrix (the disutility of all
agent-chore pair not mentioned should be assumed to be at least τ). For all k ∈ [K], for each pair of
chores bk2i−1 and b
k
2i, there are a set of agents that have disutility less than τ towards them and have
disutility larger or equal to τ towards all other chores; Additionally these agents also happen to be
either in Ak or Ak−1 (indices are modulo K). We now outline these agents and their disutilities for
every k ∈ [K]. To define the disutility less than τ , we introduce the scalars 1
n3c
= α1, α2, . . . , αK
such that each αi+1 =
3
2 · αi for all i ∈ [K − 1]. Before we define the disutility matrix, we make an
obvious claim about the scalars αi for all i ∈ [K], which will be useful later,
Claim 37. We have nc · α1 < αK ≤ 1nc .
Proof. We first show the lower bound. We have αK = (
3
2)
K ·α1 = (32)2cdlog(n)e ·α1 > 2c log(n) ·α1 =
nc ·α1. Similarly, for the upper bound, we have, αK = (32)K ·α1 = (32)2cdlog(n)e ·α1 < 22c log(n) ·α1 =
n2c · α1 ≤ 1nc (as α1 = 1n3c ).
We now define the disutility matrix:
• k = 1: For each i ∈ [n], we first define the disutilities of the agents that have disutility less
than τ for chores b12i−1 and b
1
2i. For each i ∈ [n] we have,
d(aKi′,2i−1, b
1
2i−1) = (1− α1) and d(aKi′,2i−1, b12i) = (1 + α1) for all i′ ∈ [2n]
d(aKi′,2i, b
1
2i−1) = (1 + α1) and d(a
K
i′,2i, b
1
2i) = (1− α1) for all i′ ∈ [2n]
d(a′2i−1, b
1
2i−1) = (1− α1) and d(a′2i−1, b12i) = (1 + α1)
d(a′2i, b
1
2i−1) = (1 + α1) and d(a
′
2i, b
1
2i) = (1− α1).
Therefore, for each i ∈ [2n], we have a component D1i in the disutility graph which is a com-
plete bipartite graph comprising of agents
{
∪i′∈[2n]aKi′,2i−1
}⋃{∪i′∈[2n]aKi′,2i}⋃{a′2i−1, a′2i}
and chores
{
b12i−1, b
1
2i
}
(see Figure 2 (left subfigure) for an illustration).
• 2 ≤ k ≤ K: For each i ∈ [n] we have,
d(ak−12i−1, b
k
2i−1) = (1− αk) and d(ak−12i−1, bk2i) = (1 + αk)
d(ak−12i , b
k
2i−1) = (1 + αk) and d(a
k−1
2i , b
k
2i) = (1− αk)
d(aki , b
k
2i−1) = (1− αk) and d(aki , bk2i) = (1− αk) .
Therefore, for every k such that 2 ≤ k ≤ K, for each i ∈ [2n], we have a connected com-
ponent Dki in the disutility graph which is a complete bipartite graph comprising of agents{
ak−12i−1, a
k−1
2i , a
k
i
}
and chores
{
bk2i−1, b
k
2i
}
(see Figure 2 (right subfigure) for an illustration).
It is clear that the disutility graph is a disjoint union of complete bipartite graphs, namely, the
union of Dki for all i ∈ [n] and k ∈ [K]. Therefore,
E(I) satisfies Condition 1 in Section 3.
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aK
1(2i−1)
aK
n(2i−1)
aK
1(2i)
aK
n(2i)
a′2i−1
a′2i
b12i−1
b12i
D1i
ak−12i−1
ak−12i
aki
bk2i−1
bk2i
Dki
Figure 2: Illustration of the disutility graph corresponding to the disutility matrix: On the left we
have the component D1i , and on the right we have D
k
i when 2 ≤ k ≤ K. The edges are colored
in order to also encode the disutility matrix. The thin blue edges from agents to chores depict a
disutility of 1 − α1 for D1i (left), and 1 − αk for Dki when 2 ≤ k ≤ K (right). Similarly, the thick
blue edges from agents to chores depict a disutility of 1+α1 for D
1
i (left) and 1+αk for D
k
i (right).
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Endowment Matrix. All agents in Ak have endowments of chores only in Bk for all k ∈ [K]. We
only mention the non-zero agent-chore endowments (all agent-chore endowments, if not mentioned,
are zero).
• k = 1: For each i ∈ [2n] we have,
w(a1i , b
1
i ) = n.
Also, for each i ∈ [n] we have
w(a′2i−1, b
1
2i−1) = w(a
′
2i−1, b
1
2i) =
1
2
· (1− αK) · (2n−
∑
j∈[2n]
Mj,2i−1)
w(a′2i, b
1
2i−1) = w(a
′
2i, b
1
2i) =
1
2
· (1− αK) · (2n−
∑
j∈[2n]
Mj,2i).
• 2 ≤ k ≤ K − 1: For each i ∈ [n], we have,
w(ak2i−1, b
k
2i−1) = n and w(a
k
2i, b
k
2i) = n
w(aki , b
k
2i−1) = δk and w(a
k
i , b
k
2i) = δk ,
where δk =
n·αk
2 . The reason behind the exact choice of the value of δk will become explicit
when we show that our instance satisfies the reverse ratio amplification property in Section 4.2.
As of now, the reader is encouraged to think of it just as a small scalar.
• k = K: For each i ∈ [n] we have,
w(aK2i−1,j , b
K
2i−1) = M2i−1,j and w(a
K
2i,j , b
K
2i) = M2i,j for all j ∈ [2n]
w(aKi , b
K
2i−1) = δK and w(a
K
i , b
K
2i) = δK ,
where δK =
n·αK
2 (the reason behind the choice of value will become explicit in Section 4.2).
Exchange Graph. We now construct the exchange graph of our instance and show that it is
strongly connected. Observe that the disutility graph consists of connected components Dki for
k ∈ [K] and i ∈ [n]. Also observe that every component Dki in the disutility graph comprises of
exactly two chores bk2i−1 and b
k
2i. Therefore, to show that there exists an edge from component D
k′
i′
to Dki in the exchange graph, it suffices to show that D
k′
i′ contains agents that own parts of chores
bk2i−1 and b
k
2i. We now outline the edges in our exchange graph:
• For all i ∈ [n], and 2 ≤ k ≤ K there is an edge in the exchange graph from Dki to Dk−1i : Dki
contains the agents ak−12i−1 and a
k−1
2i that own parts of chores b
k−1
2i−1 and b
k−1
2i respectively (see
Figure 3).
• For all i ∈ [n], there is an edge in the exchange graph from D1i to DKj for all j ∈ [n]: Consider
any j ∈ [n]. Observe that the component D1i contains the agents aK2j−1,2i and aK2j,2i and the
agents aK2j−1,2i and a
K
2j,2i own parts of chores b
K
2j−1 and b
K
2j respectively (see Figure 3).
Observe that all nodes are reachable from any D1i (i ∈ [n]). Also, from any arbitrary Dk
′
i′ , the
node D1i′ is reachable and since every node is reachable from D
1
i′ , every node is also reachable from
Dk
′
i′ as well. Therefore, the exchange graph is strongly connected. Therefore,
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D11 D
K
1 D
K−1
1
D21
D1i D
K
i D
K−1
i
D2i
D1n D
K
n D
K−1
n D
2
n
Figure 3: Illustration of the strong connectivity of the exchange graph. Observe that all nodes are
reachable from any D1i (i ∈ [n]). Also, from any arbitrary Dk
′
i′ , the node D
1
i′ is reachable and since
every node is reachable from D1i′ , every node is also reachable from D
k′
i′ as well. Therefore, the
exchange graph is strongly connected.
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E(I) satisfies Condition 2 in Section 3.
Thus, E(I) satisfies Conditions 1 and 2 in Section 3 and therefore admits a competitive equi-
librium. Let p(bki ) denote the price of any chore b
k
i at a competitive equilibrium. We now prove
that our instance satisfies the required properties of pairwise equal endowments, price equality, fixed
earning, price regulation and reverse ratio amplification.
4.2 E(I) Satisfies All the Properties
Pairwise Equal Endowments. Here, we show that for all i ∈ [n] and for all k ∈ [K] the total
endowment of bk2i−1 equals the total endowment of b
k
2i and the total endowments of each chore in
E(I) is O(n).
Lemma 38. For all i ∈ [2n], the total endowments of chores bk2i−1 and bk2i is
1. n + n · (1 − αK), if k = 1. In particular, a′2i−1 and a′2i together, own n · (1 − αK) units of
chores bk2i−1 and b
k
2i each.
2. n+ δk, if 2 ≤ k ≤ K.
Proof. When k = 1, the only agents that have positive endowments of b12i are a
1
2i (has an endowment
of n ) , a′2i (has an endowment of
1
2 · (1− αK) · (2n−
∑
j∈[2n] Mj,2i)) and a
′
2i−1(has an endowment
of 12 · (1− αK) · (2n−
∑
j∈[2n] Mj,2i−1)). Therefore, the total endowment of b
1
2i from the agents a
′
2i
and a′2i−1 is
=
1
2
· (1− αK) · (2n−
∑
j∈[2n]
Mj,2i) +
1
2
· (1− αK) · (2n−
∑
j∈[2n]
Mj,2i−1)
=
1
2
· (1− αK) · (4n−
∑
j∈[2n]
(Mj,2i + Mj,2i−1)).
Recall that Mj,2i + Mj,2i−1 = 1. Therefore, the total endowment of b12i from the agents a
′
2i and
a′2i−1 is
=
1
2
· (1− αK) · (4n− 2n)
= (1− αK) · n.
Therefore, the total endowment of chore b12i is n+ n · (1− αK). A similar argument will show that
the total endowment of chore b12i−1 is also n+ n · (1− αK) and that agents a′2i−1 and a′2i together,
own n · (1− αK) units of it.
When 2 ≤ k ≤ K − 1, the only agents that have positive endowments of bk2i are ak2i (has an
endowment of n) and aki (has an endowment of δk). Therefore, the total endowment is n + δk. A
similar argument will show that the total endowment of chore bk2i−1 is also n+ δk.
When k = K, the only agents that have positive endowments of bK2i are the agents a
K
2i,j (has an
endowment of M2i,j) for all j ∈ [2n] and the agent aKi (has an endowment of δK). Therefore, the
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total endowment of chore bK2i is
=
∑
j∈[2n]
M2i,j + δK
=
∑
j∈[n]
(M2i,2j−1 + M2i,2j) + δK
=
∑
j∈[n]
1 + δK
= n+ δK
A similar argument will show that the total endowment of chore bK2i−1 is also n+ δK .
Price Equality. Here we will show that the sum of prices of chores b12i−1 and b
1
2i equals that of
bK2i−1 and b
K
2i . Let us define
piki = p(b
k
2i−1) + p(b
k
2i), ∀i ∈ [2n], k ∈ [K] .
Since the prices corresponding to a competitive equilibrium is scale-invariant, we can assume with-
out loss of generality that pi11 = 2. We now state the main lemma of price equality:
Lemma 39. For all i ∈ [n] and for all k ∈ [K], we have piki = 2.
Proof. We show this in two steps: First we show that pi1i = pi
k
i for all k ∈ [K]. Then we show that
pi1i =
1
n
∑
j∈[n] pi
K
j for all i ∈ [n], implying that pi1i = pi1j for all i, j ∈ [n]. Since for all i ∈ [n] and
k ∈ [K], piki = pi1i and pi1i = pi11, we will have that piki = pi11 = 2.
We first show pi1i = pi
k
i for all k ∈ [K]: Consider any k ∈ [2,K] and any i ∈ [n]. Observe that
the agents ak−12i−1, a
k−1
2i , a
k
i and chores b
k
2i−1, b
k
2i form the connected component D
k
i in the disutility
graph. This implies that the agents ak−12i−1, a
k−1
2i and a
k
i earn all their money at a competitive
equilibrium from chores bk2i−1 and b
k
2i. Note that a
k
i owns δk units of both b
k
2i−1 and b
k
2i only and
has disutility less than τ also only for chores bk2i−1 and b
k
2i. Therefore, at a competitive equilibrium,
aki has to earn δk ·piki money from chores bk2i−1 and bk2i. Thus, the total money the agents ak−12i−1 and
ak−12i earn from chores b
k
2i−1 and b
k
2i is the total price of these chores remaining after a
k
i earns her
share of δk ·piki , which is (n+ δk) ·piki − δk ·piki = n ·piki (as the total endowment of each bk2i and bk2i−1
is n+ δk for all k ∈ [2,K] by Lemma 38). At a competitive equilibrium, the total money earned by
the agents ak−12i−1 and a
k−1
2i should be equal to the total prices of chores they own (n units of b
k−1
2i−1
and bk−12i respectively). Thus we have, n · pik−1i = n · piki . This, implies that,
piki = pi
k−1
i = · · · = pi1i .
We now show that pi1i =
1
n
∑
j∈[n] pi
K
j : This time we look into the connected component D
1
i
of the disutility graph. We can claim that the agents ∪j∈[2n]aKj,2i−1, ∪j∈[2n]aKj,2i and the agents
a′2i−1 and a
′
2i earn all of their money at a competitive equilibrium from chores b
1
2i−1 and b
1
2i.
Observe that both agents a′2i−1 and a
′
2i own some units of chores b
1
2i−1 and b
1
2i only. Since the
only chores towards which a′2i−1 and a
′
2i have disutility less than τ are also b
1
2i−1 and b
1
2i, we can
conclude that at a competitive equilibrium, to pay for their endowments, agents a′2i−1 and a
′
2i,
together earn n · (1 − αK) · pi1i amount of money from chores b12i−1 and b12i (as from Lemma 38,
statement 1, we have that a′2i−1 and a
′
2i together own n · (1 − αK) units of both chores b12i−1 and
b12i). Thus, the total money agents ∪j∈[2n]aKj,2i−1 and ∪j∈[2n]aKj,2i earn at a competitive equilibrium
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is the total prices of chores b12i−1 and b
1
2i minus the total money earned by agents a
′
2i−1 and a
′
2i:
(n + n · (1 − αK)) · pi1i − n · (1 − αK) · pi1i = n · pi1i . At a competitive equilibrium, the total money
that these agents earn must equal the total prices of chores they own. Recall that each agent aK`,`′
owns M`,`′ units of b
K
` . Therefore, we have
n · pi1i =
∑
j∈[2n]
Mj,2i · p(bKj ) +
∑
j∈[2n]
Mj,2i−1 · p(bKj )
=
∑
j∈[2n]
(Mj,2i + Mj,2i−1) · p(bKj )
=
∑
j∈[2n]
p(bKj ) (using Mj,2i−1 + Mj,2i = 1)
=
∑
j∈[n]
piKj
This implies that pi1i =
1
n
∑
j∈[n] pi
K
j .
Fixed Earning. Here, we show that in every competitive equilibrium, the earning of each agent
a′i for i ∈ [2n] is fixed.
Lemma 40. For all i ∈ [2n], we have that the earning of agent a′i is (1−αK) · (2n−
∑
j∈[2n] Mj,i).
Proof. Let i = 2i′. Then agent a′2i′ owns
1
2 · (1 − αK) · (2n −
∑
j∈[2n] Mj,2i′) units of both chores
b12i′−1 and b
1
2i′ . Since the earning of any agent at a competitive equilibrium equals the sum of prices
of chores she owns, we have that the earning of agent 2i′ is
=
1
2
· (1− αK) · (2n−
∑
j∈[2n]
Mj,2i′) · (p(b12i′−1) + p(b12i′))
=
1
2
· (1− αK) · (2n−
∑
j∈[2n]
Mj,2i′) · pi1i′
=
1
2
· (1− αK) · (2n−
∑
j∈[2n]
Mj,2i′) · 2 (by Lemma 39).
= (1− αK) · (2n−
∑
j∈[2n]
Mj,2i′).
Similarly, when i = 2i′ − 1 we can show that the total earning of agent a′2i′−1 is (1 − αK) ·
(2n −∑j∈[2n] Mj,2i′−1). Thus the total earning of any agent a′i in a competitive equilibrium is
(1− αK) · (2n−
∑
j∈[2n] Mj,i).
Price Regulation. Here, we show that for all k ∈ [K] and i ∈ [2n] the ratio of the prices of
chores bk2i−1 and b
k
2i is bounded.
Lemma 41. For all k ∈ [K] and for all i ∈ [n], we have 1−αk1+αk ≤
p(bk2i−1)
p(bk2i)
≤ 1+αk1−αk .
Proof. We prove that 1−αk1+αk ≤
p(bk2i−1)
p(bk2i)
by contradiction. The proof for the other case is symmetric.
So assume that 1−αk1+αk >
p(bk2i−1)
p(bk2i)
. In that case, none of the agents in the connected component Dki will
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do any part of chore bk2i−1 (as the disutility to price ratio of b
k
2i−1 will be strictly more than that of
bk2i). Since all the other agents have a disutility of τ for b
k
2i−1, it will remain unallocated. Therefore,
the current prices for chores are not the prices corresponding to a competitive equilibrium, which
is a contradiction.
Reverse Ratio Amplification. Lastly, we show the property that when the price of chore bki is
at a limit, then the price of chore bk+1i is at the opposite limit, i.e., when p(b
k
i ) = 1 + αk, then we
have p(bk+1i ) = 1− αk+1 and similarly when p(bki ) = 1− αk, then we have p(bk+1i ) = 1 + αk+1.
Lemma 42. For all 1 ≤ k < K and i ∈ [n], we have that,
1. if
p(bk2i−1)
p(bk2i)
= 1−αk1+αk , then
p(bk+12i−1)
p(bk+12i )
=
1+αk+1
1−αk+1 , and
2. if
p(bk2i−1)
p(bk2i)
= 1+αk1−αk , then
p(bk+12i−1)
p(bk+12i )
=
1−αk+1
1+αk+1
.
Proof. We just show the proof of part 1. The proof for part 2 is symmetric. Let us assume that
p(bk2i−1)
p(bk2i)
= 1−αk1+αk . By Lemma 39, we have that pi
k
i = p(b
k
2i−1)+p(b
k
2i) = 2. Therefore, p(b
k
2i−1) = 1−αk
and p(bk2i) = 1 + αk. Observe that agent a
k
2i owns n units of chore b
k
2i and has disutility less than
τ only for chores bk+12i−1 and b
k+1
2i (a
k
2i belongs in the connected component D
k+1
i ). Since at a
competitive equilibrium, the total earning of agent ak2i equals the sum of prices of chores she owns,
we have that ak2i earns n · p(bk2i) = n(1 + αk) amount of money from chores bk+12i−1 and bk+12i . Note
that it suffices to show that ak2i earns positive amount of money from both chores b
k+1
2i−1 and b
k+1
2i
as this would imply that
p(bk+12i−1)
p(bk+12i )
=
1+αk+1
1−αk+1 . Therefore, for the rest of the proof, we show that
ak2i earns positive amount of money from both chores b
k+1
2i−1 and b
k+1
2i . By Lemma 41, we have
p(bk+12i−1)
p(bk+12i )
≤ 1+αk+11−αk+1 , implying that agent ak2i always earns positive amount of money from chore b
k+1
2i .
Thus, it only suffices to show that ak2i earns positive amount of money from chore b
k
2i−1 as well.
We prove this by contradiction. So let us assume that ak2i earns money only from chore b
k
2i. We
will now show that the current prices of chores are not the prices corresponding to a competitive
equilibrium by distinguishing between two cases,
• p(bk+12i ) = 1 + x for some x > 0: In this case, we have p(bk+12i−1) = 1 − x (as pik+1i = 2) and
therefore p(bk+12i ) > p(b
k+1
2i−1). Observe that in this case, agent a
k+1
i will only earn her entire
money of δk+1 · (p(bk+12i−1) + p(bk+12i−1)) = 2δk+1 from bk+12i (as the disutility to price ratio of bk+12i
is strictly smaller than that of bk+12i−1). Therefore, we have that the total money agents a
k
2i and
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ak+1i earn from b
k+1
2i is,
= 2δk+1 + n · (1 + αk)
= 2δk+1 + n · (1 + 2
3
· αk+1) (as αk+1 = 3
2
· αk)
= n · (1 + 2
3
· αk+1 + 2δk+1
n
)
= n · (1 + 2
3
· αk+1 + αk+1) (as δk+1 = n
2
· αk+1)
> n · (1 + 3
2
· αk+1 +
α2k+1
2
) (as αk+1  1
3
by Claim 37)
= n · (1 + αk+1
2
) · (1 + αk+1)
= (n+ δk+1) · (1 + αk+1) (as δk+1 = n
2
· αk+1),
which is a contradiction, as the total price of bk+12i is at most (n+ δk+1) · (1 + αk+1) (there is
a total endowment of n+ δk+1 for chore b
k+1
2i by Lemma 38, and p(b
k+1
2i ) ≤ 1 + αk+1).
• p(bk+12i ) = 1− x for 0 ≤ x < αk+1: Since x < αk+1, agent ak2i will earn her entire money only
from chore bk+12i as the disutility to price ratio of chore b
k+1
2i is still less than that of chore
bk+12i−1. Since the total endowment of b
k+1
2i is n+ δk+1 by Lemma 38 and p(b
k+1
2i ) = 1− x, the
total price of chore bk+12i is,
= (n+ δk+1) · (1− x)
≤ (n+ δk+1)
< (n+
4
3
δk+1)
= n · (1 + 4δk+1
3n
)
= n · (1 + 2αk+1
3
) (as δk+1 =
n
2
· αk+1)
= n · (1 + αk) (as αk+1 = 3
2
· αk),
which is the total money that agent ak2i earns from b
k+1
2i , which is a contradiction.
Since K is even, a repeated application of Lemma 42 will yield the following lemma,
Lemma 43. We have,
1. if
p(b12i−1)
p(b12i)
= 1−α11+α1 , then
p(bK2i−1)
p(bK2i)
= 1+αK1−αK , and
2. if
p(b12i−1)
p(b12i)
= 1+α11−α1 , then
p(bK2i−1)
p(bK2i)
= 1−αK1+αK .
Now that we have shown that our instance satisfies the desired properties of price equality, fixed
earning, price regulation and reverse ratio amplification, we are ready to outline how to determine
the equilibrium strategy vector x for the instance I of the polymatrix game, given the competitive
equilibrium prices of the instance E(I) of chore division:
xi =
p(bKi )− (1− αK)
2 · αK
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It is clear that given the prices of chores at a competitive equilibrium, the equilibrium strategy
vector can be obtained in linear time. We will now show that x is the desired equilibrium strategy
vector for instance I of the polymatrix game.
Lemma 44. x = 〈x1, x2, . . . , x2n〉 is an equilibrium strategy vector for the polymatrix game instance
I.
Proof. First, observe that since our instance satisfies the price equality (Lemma 39) and price
regulation (Lemma 41) we have that for all i ∈ [2n], 1− αK ≤ p(bKi ) ≤ 1 + αK . Therefore, for all
i ∈ [2n] xi ≥ 0 . Furthermore, for all i ∈ [n] we have x2i−1+x2i = p(b
K
2i−1)+p(b
K
2i)−2(1−αK)
2·αK =
2αK
2αK
= 1
(as our instance satisfies price equality: by Lemma 39 we have p(bK2i−1) + p(b
K
2i) = 2). Now we will
show that if xT ·M∗,2i > xT ·M∗,2i−1 + 1n , then x2i−1 = 0. The proof for the other symmetric
condition will be similar. So let us assume that xT ·M∗,2i > xT ·M∗,2i−1 + 1n . Observe that the
agents that have a disutility of 1− α1 towards chore b12i are
{
∪j∈[2n]aKj,2i
}
∪ a′2i. Observe that at a
competitive equilibrium, the total earning of the agents
{
∪j∈[2n]aKj,2i
}
∪a′2i equals the sum of prices
of chores they own, which is,
=
∑
j∈[2n]
Mj,2i · p(bKj ) + (1− αK) · (2n−
∑
j∈[2n]
Mj,2i) (by Lemma 40)
=
∑
j∈[2n]
Mj,2i · (2αK · xj + (1− αK)) + (1− αK) · (2n−
∑
j∈[2n]
Mj,2i) (substituting p(b
K
j ))
=
∑
j∈[2n]
2αK · xj ·Mj,2i + (1− αK) ·
∑
j∈[2n]
Mj,2i + (1− αK) · (2n−
∑
j∈[2n]
Mj,2i)
= 2αKx
T ·M∗,2i + 2n · (1− αK).
Similarly, the total earning of the agents that have a disutility of 1 − α1 towards b12i−1 is
2αKx
T ·M∗,2i−1 + 2n · (1 − αK). Observe that the agents with disutility 1 − α1 towards b12i can
earn all their money only from either b12i or b
1
2i−1 (as these are the only chores towards which
they have disutility less than τ). Also note that both chores b12i−1 and b
1
2i have the same total
endowment which is n+n · (1−αK) by Lemma 38(part 1). Now if, the agents with disutility 1−α1
towards b12i earn their money entirely from b
1
2i, then we will have p(b
1
2i) ≥ 2αKx
T ·M∗,2i+2n·(1−αK)
n+n·(1−αK)
and p(b12i−1) ≤ 2αKx
T ·M∗,2i−1+2n·(1−αK)
n+n·(1−αK) . Since, x
T ·M∗,2i > xT ·M∗,2i−1 + 1n . we have p(b12i) >
p(b12i−1) +
1
n · 2αKn+n·(1−αK) > p(b12i−1) +
αK
n2
. Again, since αK
n2
 α1 (by Claim 37), we have that
p(b12i)
p(b12i−1)
> 1+α11−α1 , which is a contradiction as our instance satisfies price-regulation property (by
Lemma 41). Therefore, the agents that have a disutility of 1−α1 towards b12i should also earn their
money from b12i−1. But this is only possible if
p(b12i)
p(b12i−1)
= 1−α11+α1 . Since our instance also satisfies the
reverse ratio amplification, by Lemma 43 we have that
p(bK2i)
p(bK2i−1)
= 1+αK1−αK . Since p(b
K
2i) + p(b
K
2i−1) = 2
by price equality property (Lemma 39), we have that p(bK2i−1) = 1− αK . Therefore, we have
x2i−1 =
(1− αK)− (1− αK)
2 · αK
= 0.
A very similar argument will show that when xT ·M∗,2i−1 > xT ·M∗,2i + 1n , then x2i = 0.
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Thus, this immediately implies the main result of this section.
Theorem 45. Let I be the set of all instances that satisfy Conditions 1 and 2 in Section 3. Chore
division is PPAD-hard even when restricted to the set of instances I.
Proof. We bring all the points together. Normalized polymatrix game is PPAD-hard [CPY17].
Given an instance I of the normalized polymatrix game, in polynomial time we can determine
the instance E(I). E(I) satisfies the sufficiency conditions mentioned in Section 3 and therefore
admits a competitive equilibrium. Given the equilibrium prices for E(I), in polynomial time we
can determine the equilibrium strategy vector for the polymatrix game. Therefore, chore division
is PPAD-hard even on instances that satisfy the sufficiency conditions in Section 3.
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